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PICKETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY
by Hiba Hafiz*
38 CARDOZO L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2018)
The rise of the contingent and gig economies and of outsourced and
subcontracted work has left many workers with insufficient bargaining
power to successfully negotiate collective bargaining agreements with their
direct employers. This problem is exacerbated by a statutory ban on
worker picketing and boycotts of non-employers, or ‘‘secondaries,’’ even
where those employers: collude with direct employers on wage-fixing or
the suppression of union activity; have monopsony power over direct
employers; or have substantial indirect control over worker wages through
contractual arrangements.
This Article is a crucial intervention in modernizing the labor law on
worker picketing in the New Economy. It first outlines the current
distinction between direct and ‘‘secondary’’ employers under the National
Labor Relation Act’s secondary picketing ban. It then provides an
overview of New Economy work arrangements and developments in
economic theory necessary for updating the law on this distinction and for
developing the economic expertise of judicial and administrative labor
regulation. The Article then proposes unified principles for measuring
labor law’s success under New Economy work structures. These principles
align expressive and associational values with achieving economically
efficient and distributional outcomes for labor and capital.
On this foundation, the Article assesses current law on the primarysecondary distinction and finds it deficient under these principles. It puts
forward instead an economic effects-based standard that would make a
defense to secondary picketing available where employees can
demonstrate, through economic evidence, that a secondary target --whether through contractual agreements with a direct employer,
monopsony power, or oligopsonistic collusion --- has sufficient market
power to determine the wages or working conditions of picketing workers.
The rule would dramatically benefit employees in the ‘‘fissured’’
*
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workplace by providing a tool to correct for unequal bargaining power
between workers and their employers. Remedying this imbalance can
enhance protections for the expressive activity and self-determination
critical for democratic and civil society values and reverse the adverse
microeconomic wage effects and distributive consequences of the current
law.
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INTRODUCTION
When food industry leaders like Yum! Brands and Tropicana were
questioned about the existence of enslaved farmworkers in their supply
chains, their responses, like many companies criticized for supply chain
abuses, disclaimed responsibility: ‘‘We don’t believe it’s our place to get
involved in another company’s labor dispute involving its employees.’’1
Unlike other companies, however, Yum! Brands and Tropicana were
ultimately forced to accept responsibility for those farmworkers----thousands of chronically underpaid tomato and citrus harvesters in
Immokalee, Florida-----after an organization known as the Coalition of
Immokalee Workers (CIW) organized a ‘‘secondary’’ boycott against
them. In bypassing their direct, or ‘‘primary,’’ employers-----labor
contractors and growers-----the CIW were able to secure better wages,
working conditions, and a participatory role in the workplace by picketing
those who dealt with those employers, employers known as ‘‘secondaries’’
under the labor law.
Before the CIW’s supply-chain campaign, the farmworkers’ average
annual income was just over $6,500, earned for long hours of
backbreaking work, without rest or water breaks, often in 95-degree heat,
suffering harsh environmental conditions, pesticide inhalation and sexual
harassment. 2 The CIW initially organized strikes against Florida growers
to increase wage rates stagnant from the 1970s, but they were
unsuccessful in even compelling them to come to the negotiating table. 3
Like many U.S. industries, agricultural production and distribution in
Florida is increasingly concentrated: two or three major firms supply
1

John Bowe, Nobodies: Does Slavery Exist in America?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 21,
2003, at 106.
2
Id.; Stephen Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, A Penny Buys Progress, N.Y.
TIMES, April 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/business/in-florida-tomatofields-a-penny-buys-progress.html; Richard Chin Quee, Rape in the Fields: A FrontlineUnivision Investigation, WCGU (June 19, 2013), http://news.wgcu.org/post/rape-fieldsfrontlineunivision-investigation; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CULTIVATING F EAR: THE
VULNERABILITY OF IMMIGRANT F ARMWORKERS IN THE US TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
(May
2012),
available
at
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/15/cultivating-fear/vulnerability-immigrantfarmworkers-us-sexual-violence-and-sexual (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
3
Greg Asbed & Sean Sellers, The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, Verifiable
and Sustainable Change for Farmworkers, 16 U. P A. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 43
(2013).
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millions of pounds of tomatoes, directly or indirectly, to supermarkets and
fast food chains. 4 In the citrus industry, two companies own tens of
thousands of acres in Florida alone and sell to three ultimate buyers. 5
The CIW determined that market power concentration of buyers in the
supply chain created tremendous downward pressure on suppliers’-----the
growers’-----prices. They thus developed a ‘‘boomerang’’ strategy to target
those large corporate buyers through a combination of nationwide
secondary picketing and consumer boycotts. 6 Their goal was to pressure
top brands to boycott growers unless those growers improved farmworker
wages and working conditions. 7
The CIW’s secondary pickets were an unparalleled success: in under
ten years, they succeeded in establishing an award-winning ‘‘Fair Food
Program’’ where buyers at the top of the agricultural supply chain pledged
to purchase only from suppliers that: (1) paid a ‘‘penny-per-pound’’ more
per bucket of tomatoes picked; and (2) followed the Program’s
requirements for improved working conditions. 8 The Program has been
heralded as a model for improving agricultural working conditions around

4

Bowe, supra note 1, at 106. For increasing industry concentration, see, e.g., KEITH
F UGLIE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RISING CONCENTRATION IN AGRICULTURAL
INPUT INDUSTRIES INFLUENCES NEW F ARM TECHNOLOGIES (2012); Council of Economic
Advisors (CEA) Issue Brief, Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power,
Apr.
2016,
at
4-6,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_
competition_
issue_brief.pdf; Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries
Becoming More Concentrated?, 2016 China International Conference in Finance,
Xiamen,
China
(June
2016),
available
at:
http://www.cicfconf.org/sites/default/files/paper_388.pdf.
5
Bowe, supra note 1, at 106. Those buyers are Cargill, Tropicana (owned by
PepsiCo) and Minute Maid (owned by Coca-Cola).
6
Asbed & Sellers, supra note 3, at 43-44; Elly Leary, Immokalee Workers Take
Down Taco Bell, MONTHLY REV., Oct. 2005, at 11.
7
Id.
8
See F AIR F OOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, F AIR F OOD P ROGRAM: 2014 ANNUAL
REPORT 5-7 (‘‘FFSC 2014 REPORT’’), http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/reports/14SOTPWeb.pdf. For a broader history of the CIW, see SILVIA GIAGNONI, F IELDS OF
RESISTANCE: THE STRUGGLE OF F LORIDA’S F ARMWORKERS FOR JUSTICE (2011). The
Program included: a Fair Food Code of Conduct with a zero tolerance policy for forced
labor, violence, and sexual assault; a worker-triggered complaint mechanism for wage
violations and hazardous working conditions; changes in harvesting operations, including
rest breaks and the use of time clocks; and ongoing audits of participating growers’
compliance. FFSC 2014 REPORT, supra, at 2.
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the world. 9 The penny-per-pound premium lifted worker wages an extra
$60 to $80 per week, a 20 to 35 percent weekly pay increase. 10 Its supplychain monitoring has dramatically improved working conditions while
effectively sanctioning suppliers that do not comply, results that have
rarely been matched in international supply-chain monitoring schemes. 11
Without the ability to engage in a secondary boycott, it is highly
unlikely that the CIW would have been able to achieve this success. And
yet the CIW was only able to execute their secondary boycott campaign
because farmworkers are not classified as ‘‘employees’’ under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 12 Although this meant that they were not
entitled to NLRA’s protections, it also meant that they were exempt from
its punishing ban on secondary activity. At its simplest, secondary activity
is ‘‘a combination to influence A by exerting some sort of economic or
social pressure against persons who deal with A.’’13
The ban on secondary activity was intended, according to its cosponsor Senator Robert A. Taft, to ‘‘make it unlawful to . . . injure the
business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement
between an employer and his employees.’’14 But it is no accident that
Greenhouse, supra note 2. The CIW’s Fair Food Program has received a number
of awards, including the 2015 Presidential Medal for Extraordinary Efforts to Combat
Human Trafficking. See http://www.ciw-online.org/about/.
10
Greenhouse, supra note 2.
11
See, e.g., DAVID WEIL, THE F ISSURED WORKPLACE 262-65 (2014) (providing
overview of global supply-chain monitoring efforts); RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE
AND LIMITS OF P RIVATE POWER: PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 24-45 (2013); GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 15-46 (2007); Adam S. Chilton & Galit
A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, 57 STANFORD J. INT’L
L. 1-54 (2016); Daniel Berliner et al., Governing Global Supply Chains: What We Know
(and Don’t) About Improving Labor Rights and Working Conditions, 11 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 193 (2015); Richard M. Locke & Monica Romis, The Promise and Perils
of Private Voluntary Regulation: Labor Standards and Work Organization in Two
Mexican Garment Factories, 17 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 45 (2010); Mark Barenberg,
Corporate Social Responsibility and Labor Rights in US-Based Corporations, in NONGOVERNMENTAL POLITICS (M. Feher ed. 2007); Richard M. Locke et al., Does
Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike, 61 IND. LABOR REL. REV. 361
(2007).
12
Farmworkers are exempt from the National Labor Relations Act under Section
2(3). National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
13
F ELIX F RANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930).
14
93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947) (Sen. Robert A. Taft).
9
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judges, legislators and scholars have identified the secondary activity ban,
and specifically the way in which it has artificially separated ‘‘primary’’
from ‘‘secondary’’ employers, as alternately: ‘‘draw[ing] no lines more
arbitrary, tenuous, and shifting [under the labor law]’’; ‘‘gradual[ly]
sapping . . . union strength’’; giving employers a ‘‘special legal
advantage’’; and ‘‘fit[ting] very uncomfortably with a regime of free
collective bargaining.’’15 Richard Trumka, the current president of the
AFL-CIO, advocated the abolition of the entire NLRA to in part rid the
labor movement of the ‘‘secondary boycott provisions that hamstring labor
at every turn.’’16 This is because the CIW’s story is not unique in
illustrating the impact of corporate structures on workers’ wages and
terms and conditions of work and the importance of workers’ access to
secondary activity protections.
The NLRA’s overbroad definition of ‘‘secondaries’’ has adverse
effects on workers’ expressive and associational rights but also impacts
workers’ ability to negotiate an efficient wage, increase union density and
enlarge their share of the pie in the context of deep income inequality. 17
Before the statutory ban, secondary boycotts were strategically used in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century to solidify unionized workers’
gains against non-unionized employers. 18 Courts began widely enjoining
secondary strikes in the 1920s and 1930s, with dramatic impacts on union

15

Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386-387 (1969);
Sen. Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Workplace Fairness Act, S. Rep. No.
103-110, at 36 (1993); PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE F UTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 269-73 (1990). See also F RANKFURTER & GREENE,
supra note 13, at 170 (‘‘To attempt . . . to decide the propriety of a ‘secondary boycott’
is to leave definiteness of fact for ambiguity of phrasing. For to talk about ‘secondary
boycott’ is to become involved in a confusion of terms, and, therefore, in a confusion of
thought.’’).
16
Richard Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 871, 881
(1987).
17
For discussions of inequality in the U.S., see ANTHONY B. ATKINSON,
INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 133-54 (2015) (discussing the relationship between
inequality and the bargaining power of workers and labor unions); THOMAS PIKETTY,
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-F IRST CENTURY 23-24, 294-96, 314-15 (2014); LARRY M.
BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE
31-32 (2008) (providing summary of changing income distributions in the U.S. in the
twentieth century). For the adverse effects of secondary activity on union density, see
Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 403-04 (1984).
18
For the role of secondary boycotts in nineteenth-century unionism, see DAVID
MONTGOMERY, F ALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 147-48 (1988).
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strength. 19 Congress then formally amended the NLRA to ban secondary
boycott bans in the 1940s and 1950s, constructing a legal regime that
oversaw the steady decline of union density in the private sector from a
high of 35.7% after the Korean War to its current 6.4% today. 20 This
tracks a corresponding decline in non-union worker wages and an increase
in income inequality. 21 Absolute income mobility trends since 1940, or the
fraction of children who earn more than their parents, has fallen from
approximately 90% for children born in 1940 to 50% for children born in
the 1980s. 22
The consequences of the ban are all the more acute in the New
Economy where worker leverage over indirect employers’ power over
wages is paltry-----a dramatically understudied source of the rise and
persistence of economic inequality. The increasing fragmentation of work
arrangements-----replacing vertically integrated firms with the transactional
19

Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 479 (1921), superseded by
statute, Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932). For effect of
union density and inequality, see IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933 63-70, 84-90 (1969) (discussing decline of union
density and rise in inequality between 1920 and 1930 even as productivity increased);
Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 UC
IRVINE L. REV. 561, 571 (2014) (describing effects of Duplex Printing on ‘‘disappearing’’
labor movement and ‘‘rapid rise in income inequality’’).
20
See H. Rep. No. 669, 72d Congress, 1st Session, at 3 (‘‘The purpose of the
[Norris-LaGuardia] bill is to protect the rights of labor in the same manner the Congress
intended when it enacted the Clayton Act.’’); see also United States v. Hutcheson, 312
U.S. 219, 229 (1941) (describing legislative history of Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts); News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members----2016 (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf; Michael L.
Wachter, The Striking Success of the National Labor Relations Act, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 454-55 (Cynthia L.
Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2014); Barry T. Hirsch, Sluggish Institutions in a
Dynamic World: Can Unions and Industrial Competition Coexist?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP.
153 (2008).
21
See Jake Rosenfeld, Patrick Denice & Jennifer Laird, Union Decline Lowers
Wages of Nonunion Workers 1-3 (EPI, Briefing Paper No. 112811, Aug. 30, 2016),
http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/112811.pdf (finding that private-sector union decline since
late 1970s contributed to wage losses among nonunion workers); Martin A. Asher &
Robert H. DeFina, The Impact of Changing Union Density on Earnings Inequality:
Evidence from the Private and Public Sectors, 18 J. LAB. RES. 425, 426 (1997) (same).
22
Raj Chetty et al., The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income
Mobility Since 1940 8-9 (NBER Working Paper No. 22910, December 2016),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/abs_mobility_paper.pdf. See also PIKETTY,
supra note 17, at 23-24, 294-96, 314-15 (discussing rise of U.S. income inequality).
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economies of subcontracting, outsourcing, franchising and supply chain
disintegration-----accompanied by the rise of contingent work and growing
evidence of employer purchasing power, has fundamentally decentralized
employment. Instead of confronting a single employer, workers contend
with a number of entities that determine or control their wages, work
arrangements, and terms and conditions of work. 23 Yet the NLRA limits
workers to just one option when they picket for higher wages-----a
narrowly-defined direct employer. This creates a perverse incentive for
employers to avoid labor and employment law liability merely by
restructuring. 24 Picketing employers who fall outside the circumscribed
definition can result in the imposition of labor law’s harshest penalties:
injunctions against picketing, statutory damages plus the costs of suit, and
even treble damages if the picketing is found to violate the antitrust laws. 25
These high stakes have all but eliminated from labor’s tool-kit a key
source of economic pressure, which has in turn resulted in the erosion of
workers’ bargaining power and arbitrary foreclosure of their ability to
picket employers that have more impact on wage determinations than their
direct employers. 26
Current scholarship has failed to fully address these effects of the
current law or provide comprehensive proposals for reform. First,
scholars have failed to take an integrated approach to analyzing the
problems with the ban on secondary activity. For example, scholars have
examined the impact of the ban on workers’ constitutional right to free
expression without examining the ban’s adverse welfare and fairness
effects. 27 Alternatively, scholars have assessed the impact of secondary
23

WEIL, supra note 11, at 28-42.
While the NLRA does not expressly define ‘‘employers,’’ 29 U.S.C. §152(2)
(‘‘[t]he term ‘employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly
or indirectly’’), the Board and the courts have until recently interpreted the term
narrowly. See infra Section I.B and note 76.
25
29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (granting Board power to seek injunctive relief from district
court pending resolution of secondary boycott claim); id. § 187 (2000) (granting
employers statutory damages for unlawful secondary activity); 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (private
plaintiffs in antitrust actions ‘‘shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee’’).
26
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 199-200 (2004) (surveying literature on rise of
employer bargaining power vis-à-vis unions since 1980s); PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING
PROSPERITY 5 (1999) (arguing that employer power in the workplace increased since
1990s).
27
See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First
24
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boycotts on consumer welfare, with debates centering on how best to
police labor’s exemption from the antitrust laws, without assessing the
impact of such activity on wages and distribution. 28 Others have devised
alternative tests to clarify the primary-secondary distinction or bring
coherence to secondary activity doctrine without either incorporating
contemporary developments in labor economics and antitrust policy or
detailing what kind of economic evidence should be relevant for any new
rules. 29 A number of articles have more broadly extended economic
Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 300-15 (2015) (arguing that
recognitional picketing contravenes current First Amendment law); Joseph L. Guza, A
Cure for Laryngitis: A First Amendment Challenge to the NLRA’s Ban on Secondary
Picketing, 59 BUFFALO L. REV. 1267, 1270-71 (2011) (arguing that secondary boycott
ban is unconstitutional as viewpoint discrimination and as vague).
28
See, e.g., EDWARD R. MILLER, ANTITRUST LAWS AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 5760 (1984); Daniel J. Chepaitis, The National Labor Relations Act, Non-Paralleled
Competition, and Market Power, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 769, 769-70 (1997); Randall Marks,
Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without Balancing, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 699, 70003 (1986); Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 99294 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988,
989-90 (1984); Douglas Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183,
1184-85 (1980); Douglas Leslie, Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts and
Labor Antitrust, 89 HARV. L. REV. 904, 908-20 (1976); Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor
Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Law, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 659-61
(1965); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of
Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 14-17 (1963).
29
See, e.g., RALPH M. DERESHINSKY, ALAN D. BERKOWITZ & PHILIP A.
MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY BOYCOTTS 1-9 (1981); Michael C. Duff,
ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organization Bargain, 63 CATH.
U.L. REV. 837, 838-43 (2014); Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding
NLRB Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 906-7 (2005); Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic
Relationship Appropriate for Collective Bargaining, 39 B. C. L. REV. 329, 329-30
(1998); James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor
Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 894-900
(1991); Lester Asher, Secondary Boycotts: The Ally-Doctrine Revisited, 4 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 293, 293-94 (1973); Howard Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The
Reach of NLRA §§8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1000, 1000-04 (1965); Lester
Asher, Secondary Boycotts-----Allied, Neutral and Single Employers, 52 GEO. L. J. 406,
406-07 (1964); Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1363, 1363-66 (1962); Jerome R. Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor
Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341, 341-44 (1938). Chepaitis, supra note 28, at 771-72, argues
that secondary activity should only be permitted when it functions to assert union
‘‘countervailing market power’’ against an employer. My approach differs. Instead of
focusing a justification for allowing picketing on the union’s market power within a
narrowly defined labor market, I concentrate on the market power of secondaries in
determining picketed employees’ wages and employment conditions.
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analysis to the policy goals of the labor laws, but, with one exception,
have not applied that analysis to conduct specifically regulated as
secondary activity. 30
This Article decisively restructures and advances these debates by
integrating developments in the New Economy and economic theory into
the analysis of secondary activity. It presents unified principles for the
labor law’s success based on those developments, and proposing a novel
test that furthers the expressive, efficiency and equitable goals of labor
regulation. It is an attempt to move beyond the ‘‘ossification of the labor
law’’31 by reviving and adapting its purposes to contemporary workplace
arrangements, and particularly, its designation of lawful targets of
picketing. After outlining the current state of the law on the primarysecondary distinction in secondary boycott doctrine, 32 the Article takes a
step back to elaborate, as a preliminary matter, key developments in
workplace arrangements as well as in economic theory in the areas of
labor economics, theories of the firm, and contemporary antitrust policy
and analysis. For decades, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
its enforcement officers, and courts interpreting the NLRA have failed to
apply economic analysis to or empirically assess the targets of workers’
secondary activity. The NLRA’s ban on Board hiring of economists and
its failure to solicit the expertise of social scientists as amici in its highly
doctrinal adjudication have hindered the integration of contemporary
advances in economic analysis into the labor law. 33 As a key theoretical
30

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Labor Unions: Saviors or Scourges?, 41 CAP. U. L.
REV. 1, 1-8 (2013); Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform:
Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 829-30
(1996); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the
Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 421-25
(1992); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE. L.J. 1357, 1357-58 (1983).
31
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1611-12 (2002); see also WEIL, supra note 11, at 180 (arguing that
‘‘fissured’’ workplace requires ‘‘requires rethinking our basic definitions of
employment’’); Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 1, 13-36 (2016)
(detailing the ‘‘demise of the twentieth-century labor law regime’’).
32
See infra Section I, at 11-17.
33
29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (‘‘Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize
the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for
economic analysis.’’); Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Rulemaking:
Rulemaking vs. Adjudication, 64 EMORY L. J. 1469, 1475, 1486-87 (2015) (discussing
Board failure to solicit social scientific expertise); Robin Stryker, Limits on
Technocratization of the Law: The Elimination of the National Labor Relation Board’s
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contribution, the Article provides an overview of these developments and
demonstrates how they are applicable to secondary boycott law’s primarysecondary distinction. 34
The Article then develops unified principles for evaluating the labor
law’s success in the context of these critical developments. 35 While the
literature has traditionally opposed the socially valuable goals of achieving
economically efficient outcomes for labor and capital, on the one hand,
with achieving equitable distributional outcomes and protecting workers’
First Amendment expressive and associational rights, on the other, it
argues that these interests need not be opposed. Where labor regulation
can achieve all three, it should be broadly embraced as normatively ideal.
The Article then evaluates the current standard for distinguishing primary
and secondary employers under these updated principles and is the first to
review its deficiencies on expressive, microeconomic and macroeconomic
grounds. 36
Finally, the Article puts forward a principled, economic effects-based
standard that satisfies the principles for labor law’s success: the market
power rule. 37 Under that rule, indirect employers with sufficient market
power-----whether through contractual agreements with a direct employer,
monopsony power, or oligopsonistic collusion-----in the direct employer’s
labor input or product market to determine workers’ wages and/or their
terms and conditions of work would be deemed ‘‘transactional primaries’’
rather than prohibited ‘‘secondary’’ picketing targets. The picketing of
transactional primaries would be entitled to the same protections as the
picketing of primary employers. The rule would have three key benefits.
First, in addition to better protecting First Amendment expressive and
associational rights, the rule would also increase worker bargaining
power, with concomitant micro- and macroeconomic effects, without
frustrating the purposes of the statutory ban. Second, the rule would
protect workers against indirect employers’ evasion of their labor and
employment law obligations. And third, the rule would develop the
economic expertise of the Board and the courts, enhancing labor law’s
Division of Economic Research, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 341, 344-56 (providing historical
background and sociological analysis of the elimination of the NLRB’s Division of
Economic Research).
34
See infra Section II, at 17-34.
35
See infra Section III.A, at 34-39.
36
See infra Section III.B, at 39-53.
37
See infra Section IV, at 53-65.
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ability to more closely track labor market conditions in the New
Economy. The market power rule could be implemented through
adjudication as a defense available to picketing employees or through
either Board rulemaking or legislative amendment. 38
I.

THE LAW OF SECONDARY PICKETING

A. The NLRA’s Evolving and Competing Purposes
Properly delineating lawful from unlawful targets of picketing requires
first parsing the purposes of the labor law that inform the regulation of
picketing generally and the secondary boycott ban in particular. The
preamble of the NLRA lists multiple ‘‘Findings and Declaration of
Policy’’ for the federal law:
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions . . . by encouraging . . . collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection. 39
There is an extensive literature on the relationship between and
priorities among the NLRA’s purposes. Unpacking this relationship, and
these priorities, is no easy matter, given the obvious tensions between the
Wagner Act of 1935-----which set out the basic framework of the modern
NLRA-----and later amendments to the Act by the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (‘‘Taft-Hartley Amendment’’) and LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (‘‘Landrum-Griffin
Amendment’’). 40
38

Id.
See 29 U.S.C. §151; Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1390 n. 31 (1993) (discussing Wagner Act’s purposes).
40
For debates about the NLRA’s purposes, see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE
STATE AND THE UNIONS 318 (1985) (arguing that Wagner Act proponents saw right of
self-organization as only a means to labor peace); Kenneth H. Casebeer, Holder of the
Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 285, 295-96 (1987) (arguing that proto-Keynesian policy was Act’s primary
purpose); Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72
39
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The cooperationist vision of the Wagner Act set out two
interdependent goals for the new national labor policy: labor peace and
equal bargaining power between ‘‘labor’’ and ‘‘capital.’’41 Framed as a
response to the rise of large-scale industry and the severe economic effects
of the Depression on workers, the statute’s associational protections and
collective bargaining scheme were a direct attempt to increase both
individual worker bargaining power and workers’ mass purchasing power,
with the larger aim of stabilizing the economy and encouraging
macroeconomic growth. 42 As stated in the Act’s Preamble:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty
of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate . . . association substantially burdens and affects
the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the
purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences
as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers

CORNELL L. REV. 245, 254-56 (1987) (equating Congress’s primary goal of industrial
peace with allocative efficiency); James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes:
Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 7, 10-13
(1985) (arguing that ‘‘advancement of economic and social justice, rather than the
reduction of industrial strife,’’ was Wagner Act’s primary objective).
41
Wachter, supra note 20, at 429-31 (discussing twin purposes of promoting
bargaining equity and industrial peace); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 30, at 461 (same).
42
See 79 Cong. Rec. 7565, 7567-68, 7572 (1935) (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (‘‘2 LEGIS. HIST.’’), at 2318, 2326, 2330, 2339-40 (1985);
Barenberg, Political Economy, supra note 39, at 1418-19.
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and employees. 43

For the Act’s chief architect, Senator Robert Wagner, equal bargaining
power was essential for the Act’s success. He believed cooperation was
‘‘given only to equals,’’ and ‘‘[t]o match the huge aggregate of modern
capital[,] the wage-earner must be organized.’’44 In Congressional debates,
he claimed it ‘‘simply absur[]d to say that an individual, one of 10,000
workers, is on equality with his employer in bargaining for his wages . . .
When 10,000 come together and collectively bargain with the employer,
then there is equality of bargaining power.’’45 He and others emphasized
collective bargaining as a means of ridding individual workers’
employment contracts with large-scale employers from duress. 46 When the
Supreme Court upheld the NLRA’s constitutionality, it did so on the basis
of the government’s interest in promoting economic growth by facilitating
equal bargaining power between employers and employees. 47
The Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the Wagner
Act had different goals. Justified as necessary to restrain the purported
abuses and excesses enabled by the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin Amendments emphasized individualistic and employerfriendly policy goals not emphasized by the earlier statute. These included
protecting individual workers’ autonomy to reject collective bargaining
and restraining unions’ ability to obstruct commerce. 48 By challenging
unions’ ability to present a unified front against employers and weakening
29 U.S.C. at § 151. For discussion of the Wagner Act’s cooperationist vision, see
Barenberg, Political Economy, supra note 39, at 1427-30.
44
Barenberg, Political Economy, supra note 39, at 1467 & 1467 n.377 (citing Robert
Wagner, The New Responsibilities of Organized Labor, Address at the Convention of the
New York State Federation of Labor 2, 6 (August 28, 1928)).
45
To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm.
On Education and Labor, 73d Cong. 9 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (‘‘1
LEGIS. HIST.’’), at 47 (1985).
46
See 78 Cong. Rec. 3678-79 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted
in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 45, at 20 (‘‘The primary requirement for cooperation is that
employers and employees should possess equality of bargaining power. ’’); see also 79
Cong. Rec. 6183, 6184 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 42, at 2283
(same); S. 2926, 73d. Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS.
HIST., supra note 45, at 1 (identifying centralized economic activity as negating genuine
liberty of contract).
47
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. , 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).
48
Gross, supra note 40, at 12-16.
43
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the economic weapons unions had available, the Amendments were in
tension with the Wagner Act’s focus on bilateral labor-management
cooperation reliant on establishing equal bargaining power between the
two to ensure labor peace.
Over time, the NLRB and the courts reconciled the collectivist aims of
the Wagner Act with the more individualist concerns of the later
Amendments by reconceiving the primary purposes of the NLRA as the
promotion of ‘‘industrial peace’’ and the ‘‘free flow of commerce.’’49 That
reconciliation has contributed to an emphasis on continued production over
the competitive wage and distributional goals of the labor law, regardless
of the broader state of the economy and any resulting economic effects. 50
B. The NLRA’s Secondary Picketing Ban
The secondary activity ban, enacted as part of the Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the NLRA, was a critical component of
the shift away from the Act’s distributional goals in favor of prioritizing
continued production. Under the amended provisions, it is an unfair labor
practice for workers in a labor dispute with a direct employer to
‘‘threaten, coerce, or restrain’’ other, ‘‘secondary’’ or ‘‘neutral’’
employers to join forces with them in boycotting or refusing to deal with
their immediate employer (‘‘Section 8(b)(4)’’). 51 It is also an unfair labor
practice to induce or encourage employees of another employer to ‘‘strike
or refus[e] in the course of his employment’’ to deal with or handle a
49

For emphasis on industrial peace in the legislative history, see S. Rep. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935), reprinted in 5 NLRB, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 2300 (1935) (‘‘The first objective of the
bill is to promote industrial peace. ’’). For case law emphasizing the purposes of industrial
peace and the free flow of commerce, see, e.g., NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees of
Am., Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 208 (1986) (stating Act’s basic purpose ‘‘is to preserve
industrial peace’’); First Nat' l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981)
(stating Act’s fundamental aim as ‘‘the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace
to preserve the flow of interstate commerce’’).
50
See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR
LAW 111 (1983) (‘‘The most commonly expressed goal of the Wagner Act was the
achievement of industrial peace.’’); Donald A. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation
of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 594 (1985) (‘‘Since [the Great
Depression], ‘industrial harmony’ has replaced ‘equality of bargaining power’ as the
primary justification of our labor law. ’’); Schwab, supra note 40, at 252-53 (discussing
the labor law’s purpose of industrial peace and equating it with economic efficiency).
51
29 U.S.C. at § 158(b)(4).

16

PICKETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY

direct employer’s goods or services. 52
Prior to the Wagner Act, secondary activity was prohibited under a
number of legal theories, from criminal and antitrust conspiracy to the
torts of trespass and disturbing the peace. 53 While the Clayton Antitrust
Act of 1914 arguably legalized peaceful secondary pressure, the Supreme
Court in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering stripped workers of virtually all
secondary activity protections granted under that Act. 54 After significant
pressure from organized labor and progressives, Congress revived
protections for peaceful union secondary conduct in the Norris-La Guardia
Act of 1932. 55 However, the legality of secondary activity remained
controversial, and in 1947, over a Presidential veto, Section 8(b)(4) was
amended to the Act. 56 Taft Hartley passed in the context of increased antiunion sentiment following worker strikes protesting post-World War II
layoffs and price increases. 57
The purposes of the proscription on secondary activity were multifold.
First, it was intended to protect employers neutral to a labor dispute from
union pressure that would force them to cease dealing with a struck
employer. 58 The concern was that of enmeshing those with only indirect
52

Id.
See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: F ROM INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM 69-89 (1995) (documenting pre-Wagner Act theories
of legal proscription of secondary boycotts).
54
Pub. L. No. 106-274, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C.); Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 479.
55
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§101-115
(1994)).
56
See 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4); see also Gerard D. Reilly, The Legislative History of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285, 285-300 (1960) (discussing legislative
history of Taft-Hartley Amendments).
57
See MELVYN DUBOFSKY & F OSTER RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 326-35 (2004) (describing labor strife and mobilization of business community
around Taft-Hartley Amendments); TOMLINS, supra note 40, at 148-50 (same); Gross,
supra note 40 (describing conditions that gave rise to the Taft-Hartley amendments). The
secondary activity prohibitions were strengthened in the Landrum-Griffin Amendments of
1959. Pub. L. 86-257 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§153, 158-60, 164, 186-87 (1994)).
58
2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF
1947 [‘‘1947 LEGIS. HIST.’’], at 1106 (1948); id. at 547; see also NLRB v. Denver Bldg.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951) (citing congressional objective ‘‘of shielding
unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own’’);
Raymond Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp, 19 U.
KAN. L. REV. 651, 653-655 (1971) (discussing legislative history and purpose of
53
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power to resolve a labor dispute in the adverse economic consequences of
a strike. 59 Second, the prohibition was intended to prevent unions from
colluding with employers to reduce competition by targeting an
employer’s competitors. 60 Finally, Congress was concerned about unions
coercing non-unionized workers of other employers to compel them to
accept union representation through a form of ‘‘top-down organizing.’’61
The Board enforces these goals by distinguishing between ‘‘primary’’
and ‘‘secondary’’ employers. While the Board has recently begun to
extend statutory ‘‘employer’’ status to franchisors and hiring firms in the
franchising and temporary employment contexts under common law
agency tests, 62 it defines ‘‘primary’’ and ‘‘secondary’’ employers under
Section 8(b)(4) quite differently. 63 Employers not in a direct employment
relationship with picketing statutory employees are deemed ‘‘secondaries’’

secondary activity ban).
59
Id.
60
93 Cong. Rec. 270 (1947) (citing Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW,
325 U.S. 797, 798-800 (1945)); Fred W. Jones, The ‘‘Secondary Boycott’’ Provision of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 9 LA. L. REV. 282, 285 (1949). See also Campbell, supra note 28,
at 1022-39 (discussing adverse effects of extending labor’s monopoly on inputs to firm
outputs through secondary activity); Leslie, Principles, supra note 28, at 1224-33
(proposing antitrust regulation of certain union-management schemes to regulate product
markets by controlling prices, outputs or market allocation); Meltzer, supra note 28, at
710 (discussing unions’ ability to collude with employers); Winter, supra note 28, at 16
(discussing anticompetitive incentives in both labor and management where collecting
bargaining is based on employee organization along product market lines).
61
1947 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 58, at 4432-37; see also LAURA WEINRIB, TAMING
OF F REE SPEECH 33-34, 304-305, 321 (2016) (providing historical context for concerns
about union coercion of non-union employees of other employers); Weiler, supra note
17, at 415-16.
62
See Browning-Ferris Industries of California, 362 NLRB No. 186, slip op. at 2,
15-16, 18-20 (2015) (expanding joint-employer standard to include indirect right to
control the ‘‘means or manner of employees’ work and terms of employment. ’’); id. at 12
(applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958)’s common-law agency test to
define a ‘‘servant’’); McDonald’s USA, LLC, a joint employer, et al., 362 NLRB No.
168, slip op. at 2 (2015) (applying Browning-Ferris joint-employer test to franchising);
see also Retro Environmental, Inc. , 364 NLRB No. 70, slip op. at 1 (2016) (applying
Browning-Ferris joint-employer test to temporary staffing agency and construction
company). As of this writing, the status of Browning-Ferris’s joint-employer test is
uncertain and remains on appeal before the D.C. Circuit. See Browning-Ferris Industries
of California, Inc., d/b/a/ Browning-Ferris Newby Island Recyclery v. National Labor
Relations Board, Nos. 16-1028, 16-1063 and 16-1064 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 7, 2016).
63
See supra note 24.
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with two narrow exceptions. 64 First, under the ‘‘ally doctrine,’’ otherwise
neutral employers who perform struck work farmed out by a primary
employer forfeit their neutral status. 65 Second, under the ‘‘single employer
doctrine,’’ an employer forfeits neutral status if it functions as a single
employer with a direct employer under a demanding four-factor test: (1)
common ownership; (2) common management; (3) interrelation of
operations, and (4) common or centralized control of labor relations. 66
Union penalties for picketing secondary employers are severe: employers
can request injunctive relief from the NLRB’s Solicitor General and can
directly seek statutory damages under Section 303 of the LMRA as well as
potential treble damages under the antitrust laws. 67 Union violations of
Section 8(b)(4) are the only unfair labor practice that can result in
statutory damages available to employers under NLRA.
Although the ban serves important goals, the very broad definition of
‘‘secondary’’ employers that the Board employs creates serious problems
for worker bargaining power in New Economy workplace structures-----as
the next Section explores. 68
II.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEW ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC THEORY

The secondary boycott ban and its exceptions fail to take account of or
integrate the dramatic changes in workplace arrangements that have comet
to characterize the New Economy. Nor do they consider key
contemporary developments in labor economics, the theory of the firm,
and antitrust policy, either in assessing which economic actors impact
labor conditions or in determining, on a more theoretical level, how
corporate restructuring and contractual relationships have shifted
bargaining power away from labor in favor of both direct and indirect
See, e.g., Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626 (1967)
(describing ‘‘ally doctrine’’ exception to secondary boycott rule); Chauffeurs, Teamsters
& Helpers, Local 776 (Pennsy Supply, Inc.), 313 N.L.R.B. 1148, 1164 n.2 (1994)
(defining the Board’s interpretation of ‘‘single employer’’). See also DERESHINSKY, supra
note 29, at 121-189 (summarizing case law).
65
Carpet, Linoleum, Soft Tile, etc. Local 419 v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 747, 753 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (discussing ‘‘ally’’ doctrine).
66
See, e.g., United Mine Workers (Boich Mining Co.), 301 N.L.R.B. 82, 873
(1991).
67
29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (granting Board power to seek injunctive relief); id. § 187
(2000) (granting employers statutory damages); 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (granting private
antitrust plaintiffs treble damages remedy plus costs of suit and attorneys’ fees).
68
See infra note 40.
64
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employers. These developments provide useful analytical frameworks for
assessing labor market dynamics and pricing structures, offering critical
interventions and guiding principles for identifying which entities
determine workers’ wages and working conditions and which are ‘‘wholly
unconcerned’’ with those determinations. By doing so, they can aid in
identifying exactly where the current primary-secondary distinction fails to
track the statute’s purposes and offer insights for revising that distinction
to better further them.
A. New Economy Work Structures
Dramatic changes in the structure and valuation of work present
significant challenges to labor law’s outdated regulatory infrastructure. A
growing number of workers are in work arrangements where direct as
well as indirect employers determine their wages. Economists estimate
that workers engaged in alternative work arrangements-----temporary, oncall or contract workers as well as independent contractors or
freelancers-----rose from 10.7 percent, or around 15 million workers, in
2005 to 15.8 percent, or 23.6 million workers, in late 2015. 69 Some
predict that as much as 40 percent of the American workforce will be
contingent workers or independent contractors by 2020. 70 While
comprehensive numbers have not yet been collected, there are an
estimated 3.3 million workers in fast-food franchises and 525,000 in
outsourced janitorial services. 71 Over 80 percent of hotel properties
alternate company-operated hotels with franchising and subcontracting
arrangements, 72 and the hotel industry overall employs 1.86 million
workers. 73 There are also countless workers laboring in vertically
disintegrated supply chains-----manufacturing and supplying parts, handling
distribution, providing contracted-for services, all spun off from
previously vertically-integrated companies-----including in the fastest-

69

Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work
Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015 7-8 (Princeton University Industrial
Relations
Section,
Working
Paper
No.
603,
2016),
available
at
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01zs25xb933.
70
INTUIT, INTUIT 2020 REPORT: TWENTY TRENDS THAT WILL SHAPE THE NEXT
DECADE 20-21 (October 2010), http://http-download.intuit.com/http.intuit/CMO/intuit/
futureofsmallbusiness/intuit_2020_report.pdf.
71
WEIL, supra note 11, at 129-30, 133.
72
Id. at 146, 154-55.
73
Id. at 155.
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growing U.S. industries. 74
Restructuring work arrangements are a key way employers in the New
Economy evade compliance with labor and employment law. 75 New
Economy employment blurs firm responsibility for the terms and
conditions of work and creates an imbalance in worker bargaining power
relative to indirect employers. 76 By shifting from setting wages to setting
prices for contracted-out, primarily non-union work, employers operating
within disintegrated supply chains, franchisor-franchisee relationships, and
complex production-and-distribution networks can capture the difference
between contracted-out wages (at the marginal revenue product of labor)
and prevailing wage rates in the vertical integration era that were set
through collective bargaining or internal labor markets while shedding the

See, e.g., EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO ET AL., CHAIN OF GREED: HOW WALMART’S
DOMESTIC OUTSOURCING PRODUCES EVERYDAY LOW WAGES AND POOR WORKING
CONDITIONS FOR WAREHOUSE WORKERS (2012); Gary Herrigel & Jonathan Zeitlin,
Inter-Firm Relations in Global Manufacturing: Disintegrated Production and its
Globalization, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 52763 (G. Morgan & J. Campbell, eds., 2010).
75
WEIL, supra note 11, at 185-208 (detailing how competing definitions of
‘‘employee’’ and ‘‘employer’’ in labor and employment law fail to track New Economy
employment).
76
See generally WEIL, supra note 11, at 7-27 (collecting empirical literature on
decline in workers’ real wages, benefits, employment security and ability to voice
concerns in ‘‘fissured’’ workplace); see also LABOR IN THE NEW ECONOMY (Katherine G.
Abraham, James R. Speltzer & Michael Harper eds., 2010) (collecting essays by leading
economists on effects of corporate restructuring on earning inequality, benefits, job
security, work hours, and workplace health and safety); Andrias, supra note 31, at 13-31
(discussing the relationship between economic restructuring and decline of worker
influence in their workplaces and in policy-making at the state and federal levels); Mark
Barenberg, Widening the Scope of Worker Organizing: Legal Reforms to Facilitate MultiEmployer Organizing, Bargaining, and Striking, ROOSEVELT INST. 1-10 (Oct. 1 2015),
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Widening-the-Scope-of-WorkerOrganizing.pdf (discussing diminution of labor’s bargaining power under corporate
restructuring); Annette Bernhardt, The Role of Labor Market Regulation in Rebuilding
Economic Opportunity in the U.S. , ROOSEVELT INST. 1-13 (2014) (arguing for
strengthened labor regulation due to growing employer evasion of legal responsibility
under new corporate structures); Harry Katz, United States: The Spread of Coordination
and Decentralization without National-Level Tripartism, in NEW STRUCTURE OF LABOR
RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 192-212 (discussing effects of decentralized collective
bargaining on worker bargaining power in the United States); Craig Becker, Labor Law
Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527 (1996) (describing transition
and evolution of employment relationships with decline of manufacturing sector and rise
of service sector).
74
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costs of legal liability as statutory ‘‘employers.’’77 Yet, employers within
these disintegrated networks have detailed contractual provisions with
direct employers that set standards, quality controls and monitoring
requirements on production and service. 78 The contractual delineations of
responsibility for employment conditions between employers disrupt the
traditional principal-agent model of employment adopted under the
NLRA. 79 And these arrangements place many obstacles in workers way as
they attempt to improve their plight through collective action with others.
The fragmentation of protections even within a given workplace-----between
ill-defined direct employees and independent contractors, temporary and
permanent workers, and direct and outsourced workers-----increases
workers’ coordination costs and impedes the building of solidarity and
cohesion necessary to build a union. 80
Employees that do have labor law protections face a series of legal
obstacles in organizing and bargaining with multiple employers, 81
including the fact that the post-industrial, service sector-oriented economy
has made single-firm careers itinerant and flexible. 82 Core features of the
labor law designed to improve working conditions on the timescale of a
worker’s productive life-----emphasizing seniority systems and narrow
bargaining units for workers trained to specialize in circumscribed and
firm-specific job skills-----are not compatible with, say, on-call employment
at Uber, temp work, or the transient, project- and team-oriented job
descriptions through which workers migrate in a single job. 83 Finally,
77

WEIL, supra note 11, at 88-90; STONE, supra note 26, at 68-86; see also Rosenfeld
et al., supra note 21 (summarizing findings on independent effects of union decline on
wages, arguing that private-sector union decline since late-1970s contributed to
substantial wage losses among non-union workers); Harper, supra note 29, at 330
(discussing effects of corporate reorganization on collective bargaining rights in
segmented employment arrangements).
78
WEIL, supra note 11, at 99-177 (detailing monitoring and quality control
provisions in subcontracting, franchising, and supply chain agreements).
79
Harper, supra note 29, at 334.
80
See, e.g., STONE, supra note 26, at 206-9 (describing NLRB’s failure to accord
bargaining unit determinations with ‘‘blurring of boundaries . . . typical of work
practices today.’’); David S. Pedulla, The Hidden Costs of Contingency, 92 SOC. F ORCES
691, 692-3 (summarizing empirical studies of effects of contingent labor on standard,
full-time employees’ earnings and working conditions).
81
Barenberg, Widening the Scope, supra note 76, at 10-14 (listing obstacles to
multiemployer organizing and bargaining under current law).
82
STONE, supra note 26, at 87-99 (describing rise of post-industrial ‘‘new
employment relationship’’).
83
See id. at 125, 203-9 (pointing to features of American unionism as ‘‘antithetical to
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workers’ access to NLRB remedies is so protracted that there is little
incentive in the fast-paced economy to utilize or rely on enforcement
mechanisms for labor rights protections. 84
Labor law’s ability to successfully adapt will determine its relevance as
a regulatory mechanism capable of achieving its policy goals. 85 The
failures of current law provide ammunition for questioning the value of
labor regulation altogether and invite calls for its dismantling. 86 A critical
political and scholarly project justifying the NLRA’s regulatory regime
must connect its stated policy goals with a goal long argued to be in
opposition to them: maximizing social welfare. 87 In fact, efficiency goals
are not antithetical to the purposes of the labor law. With the Board’s
recent decisions and rulemaking on the chopping block, it is crucial to
revive and adapt the NLRA’s purposes by integrating current
developments in economic theory that inform the labor law’s ability to
achieve both welfare and fairness benefits. These developments explain
the effects of workplace arrangements on worker bargaining power and
offer tools to correct for existing regulations’ lagging behind. The
following Subsections provide an overview of these developments,
concentrating on how they are relevant for secondary boycott law’s
primary-secondary distinction specifically.
B. Developments in Labor Economics on Wage Determination
The primary-secondary distinction and its common law carve-outs for
‘‘allies’’ and ‘‘single employers’’ fail to take into account how current

boundaryless careers.’’).
84
Andrias, supra note 31, at 25-26 (detailing failures of NLRB’s remedial scheme);
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1777 & n.24 (1983) (same).
85
See 29 U.S.C. § 151; Barenberg, Political Economy, supra note 39, at 1390 n. 31
(1993) (discussing Wagner Act purposes).
86
See, e.g., Robert Iafolla, New House Labor Committee Chair Questions Need for
Unions, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-unionsidUSKBN13U2NE (reporting Rep. Virginia Foxx’s arguments to repeal Obama
administration labor policies because organized labor has ‘‘lost its reason for being’’).
87
See, e.g., Epstein, Labor Unions, supra note 30, at 33 (‘‘At one time, unions
offered attractive benefits to their members, but always at the cost of overall social
welfare.’’); Epstein, Common Law, supra note 30, at 1402-3 (arguing that American
labor law ‘‘shrinks the pie’’ for certain workers’ benefit over other workers and
employers).
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labor markets work, particularly in the area of wage determination. 88 The
Wagner Act envisioned collective bargaining as the exclusive vehicle for
wage setting, isolated from what John R. Commons described as the
‘‘cutthroat competition’’ of external market wage-setting that the ‘‘cheapest
laborer’’ would accept. 89 The Act’s success turned on the fact that a single
‘‘employer’’ had the power to lift its employees’ wages outside those
competitive determinations. 90 Once suspended, workers and employers
could bargain for a neat division of firm revenues from sales in a final
product market. 91
In fact, the economic arrangement in contemporary workplaces is
often far more complex. Many firms have developed what economists call
‘‘internal labor markets,’’ or ILMs. 92 ILMs are administrative units
‘‘within which the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of
administrative rules and procedures’’ within a firm that establish methods
of compensation, benefit packages, and job ladders for in-house
promotional hiring. 93 The impact of internal labor market structures on
workplace organization has been profound. 94 Employers benefit from
88

WEIL, supra note 11, at 76-92 (collecting studies on economic effects of fissuring
on wage determination); ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT
COMPETITION IN LABOR MARKETS 115-40, 217-234 (2003) (describing employers’ wage
policies in monopsonistic labor markets); ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE
UNIONS 42-43 (3d ed. 1989).
89
JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 48
th
(4 ed. 1936); Wachter, supra note 20, at 428, 440-42, 430-31.
90
Id.; see also Barenberg, Political Economy, supra note 39, at 1421.
91
Id.
92
For foundational discussions of internal labor markets, see RICHARD LESTER,
HIRING PRACTICES AND LABOR COMPETITION (1954); LLOYD REYNOLDS, THE
STRUCTURE OF LABOR MARKETS (1951); Clark Kerr, The Balkanization of Labor
Markets, in LABOR MOBILITY AND ECONOMY OPPORTUNITY 92-110 (1954); see also John
Dunlop, The Tasks of Contemporary Wage Theory, in NEW CONCEPTS IN WAGE
DETERMINATION 117-39 (George Taylor & Frank Pierson, eds. 1957).
93
PETER DOERINGER & MICHAEL PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
MANPOWER ANALYSIS 1-3 (1971); see also Paul Osterman & M. Diane Burton, Ports
and Ladders: The Nature and Relevance of Internal Labor Markets in a Changing World,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WORK AND ORGANIZATION 426-39 (Stephen Ackroyd et
al. eds., 2006) (discussing implications of contemporary workplace changes for internal
labor market literature); see also STONE, supra note 26, at 28, 49-63 (discussing
historical transition from scientific management to internal labor market between the
1950s and 1970s).
94
Oded Stark & Walter Hyll, On the Economic Architecture of the Workplace:
Repercussions of Social Comparisons among Heterogeneous Workers, 29 J. LAB. ECON.
349, 350-75 (2011) (modeling how wage sharing and fairness concerns impact
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establishing internal structures as a means of capturing the complexity of
labor as a dynamic input of production: fixed compensation structures
allowed employers to recover recruitment and training costs by
incentivizing longer-term attachments through higher wage premiums and
turnover reduction. 95 ILMs are also a means by which firms overcome
holdup problems, reduce monitoring costs, and prevent either workers or
employers from cheating the other in the face of incomplete employment
contracts. 96 A dominant trend of ILMs is the establishment of horizontal
and vertical pay equity structures to maintain ‘‘internal harmony and
morale’’ by setting standard pay across and between comparable positions
within a firm, even if individual performance varies. 97
While ILM schemes were prevalent and remain common, 98 the growth
compensation policy and worker productivity). Labor scholars debate the impact of
unionization in the creation of internal labor markets through the establishment of
seniority arrangements and other protections for job security. For example, Clark Kerr
and Paul Osterman argue that internal labor market policies are a result of union pressure
on employers. Kerr, supra note 92, at 29; Paul Osterman, Introduction: The Nature and
Importance of Internal Labor Markets, in INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS, supra note 93, at
1, 9; see also WEILER, supra note 15, at 8-9 (1990). On the other hand, Katherine Stone
contends that, as a historical matter, internal labor market structures were established by
employers in a period that ‘‘predated unions, often by several decades,’’ and that such
structures are frequently found in nonunion firms. STONE, supra note 26, at 60-61.
95
GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 29-160 (3d ed., 1964) (explaining single
employer compensation systems as mechanisms of structuring worker incentives under
continuous employment); Walter Oi, The Fixed Employment Costs of Specialized Labor,
in THE MEASUREMENT OF LABOR COSTS 63-122 (Jack Triplett ed., 1983) (explaining
how firms manage complexity of changing labor productivity through ILM policies).
96
WEIL, supra note 11, at 81; BECKER, supra note 95, at 26 (explaining development
of ILMs as reduction in firm costs); Katherine V.W. Stone, Policing Employment
Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 353, 364-73 (1993)
(discussing evolution and value of ILMs to employers and employees); Paul R. Milgrom,
Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design, 96 J.
POL. ECON. 42-60 (1988); Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 25 J. ECON.
LIT. 1144-75 (1988); Oliver Williamson, Jeffrey Harris & Michael Wachter,
Understanding the Employment Relation --- The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6
BELL J. ECON. 250 (1975) (linking the development of internal labor markets to
employers’ need to develop self-enforcing performance incentives).
97
TRUMAN BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T F ALL DURING A RECESSION 79, 81 (1999)
(explaining existence of pay equity structures and nominal wage rigidity on fairness
grounds); see also WEIL, supra note 11, at 83-85 (discussing evolution of internal equity
schemes); David E. Card, Alexandre Mas, Enrico Moretti & Emmanuel Saez, Inequality
at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2981,
2982-3003 (2012).
98
BEWLEY, supra note 97, at 70-85 (documenting ILM prevalence); see also Emily
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of contingent employment has impacted workers’ ability to access and
benefit from them. 99 Because contingent work is priced on the external
market, employers can avoid the downward rigidity of wages and loss
aversion of existing employees. 100 Evasion of direct employer liability
under labor and employment laws also lowers the hiring and labor costs of
contingent workers and/or the costs of doing business with those who rely
on contingent work. 101 Employers have thus increasingly moved towards
the benefits of ‘‘fissured’’ workplace structures without wanting to
relinquish the benefits of relational contracting for labor inputs,
characterized by repeat play, extensive monitoring, and reliance on
workers’ development of firm-specific skills. 102 Ordinarily, but for a
contract between direct employers and labor providers, such work would
be less ‘‘market-oriented,’’ more determined by firm-specific value-added,
and wages would be set by the level of competition within an ILM rather
than based on external market rates. Instead, by switching from wagesetting to pricing, firms are able to wage discriminate and capture wage
differential rents through contract. 103 As David Weil describes it, ‘‘shifting
work outward allows redistribution of gains upward.’’104
C. Developments in Economic Theories of the Firm
The theory of the firm is another significant area of study in the
economics literature not incorporated into analysis of the primarysecondary distinction. Neither the Wagner Act nor its subsequent
Breza, Supreet Kaur & Yogita Shamdasani, The Morale Effects of Pay Inequality, NAT’L
BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 22491 (2016).
99
STONE, supra note 26, at 67-86 (describing shift from permanent to contingent
employment).
100
BEWLEY, supra note 97, at 18-19 (‘‘greater flexibility of hiring pay (for secondary
workers) derived from the lesser importance of internal pay equity.’’).
101
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees, 27 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 272-73 (2006) (providing overview of lack of legal protections
for contingent workers); David Autour, Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust
Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of Employment Outsourcing, 21 J. LAB. ECON. 1, 3
(2003) (finding that firm reliance on outsourced workers grew at a higher rate in states
that adopted exceptions to common law doctrine of at-will employment and with smaller
declines in unionization).
102
WEIL, supra note 11, at 60-72 (discussing detailed, firm-specific work provided
by contracted entities with lead firms as well as extensive, low-cost monitoring networks
enabling quality control).
103
Id. at 20, 87-91.
104
Id. at 90.
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amendments explicitly proffer a theory of the firm in which labor disputes
are resolved. 105 And neither Board nor court decisions have developed one
or applied one to their analysis of who should count as a ‘‘primary’’ or a
‘‘secondary’’ under Section 8(b)(4). By failing to do so, they have failed to
integrate into their analysis of the primary-secondary distinction the effects
of employer control over asset usage on contracting employers’ relative
bargaining power with each other ex ante and ex post. They also fail to
consider how a ‘‘secondary’’ employer’s bargaining power over the wages
and terms and conditions of work of a primary employer, or on the
division of ex post surplus in the network of relationships between primary
employers, their workers, and contracting parties affect who should count
as a ‘‘primary’’ rather than a ‘‘secondary.’’ Incorporating a nuanced theory
of the firm into the analysis of the primary-secondary distinction is crucial
not only for understanding firm incentives within the ‘‘fissured’’
workplace but also for discerning the effects of decisions about corporate
structure, contracting and ownership rights on employer control and
employee bargaining power.
Under a neoclassical conception of the firm, assuming no agency
costs, a firm’s production choices are focused on maximizing the owner’s
welfare, and the firm functions as a set of production plans capitalized
upon by managers buying and selling inputs and outputs to achieve that
goal. 106 The revisions of Coasean transaction-cost economics introduced
the impact of planning and contracting costs on the structure of the firm.
Specifically, Coasean theory marked the firm’s boundaries where marginal
cost savings from transacting within the firm are the same as the costs of
any errors resulting from concentrating decision-making in a single
managerial authority plus any associated administrative rigidity costs. 107
105

The Board applies a narrowly rebuttable presumption in favor of initial bargaining
units being limited to a single facility of a single employer, allowing multi-employer
bargaining units only under certain circumstances. J&L Plate, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 429,
429 (1993).
106
For accounts of neoclassical theory of the firm, see HAL R. VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6-78 (1984); JAMES MITCHELL HENDERSON & RICHARD E.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 64-134 (1980).
Principal-agent theory complicated this account by identifying conflicts of interest
between different economic actors, observability problems, and asymmetries of
information within the firm. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the
Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral
Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979).
107
Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1757, 1760-61 (1989) (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4

PICKETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY

27

Three main criticisms of Coasean theory of the firm complicated his
account and contribute to the explanation of both workplace ‘‘fissuring’’
and its economists challenged Coase’s dichotomy between an isolated,
dominant internal authority within the firm and the authority of
competitively determined market valuations, arguing that a firm’s
authority to dictate obedience from an employee is determined less by
authority relations and more by the employee’s opportunity costs on the
market. 108 Second, they highlighted the importance of sunk costs and lockin effects like firm- and relationship-specific worker training on the
boundaries of the firm, introducing ways in which external markets fail to
guide employers and employees’ opportunity costs after such
investments. 109 Finally, economists broke down distinctions between
internal and external markets to view the firm as a nexus of contracts with
one instituting and governing ‘‘standard form’’ contract establishing the
business entity and allowing a proliferation of contractual relationships
with employees, customers, and others. 110
Later economic theorists developed a property-rights approach to the
theory of the firm, 111 viewing the firm as the owner of residual rights of
control over nonhuman assets in contractual relationships. 112 Ownership
rights structure the contracting parties’ incentives: ‘‘When contracts are
incomplete, the boundaries of the firm . . . determine who owns and
controls which assets.’’113 The choice between contracting with an outside
firm and merging or integrating with it affects workers’ incentives
depending on whether any training or investment in skills benefits a direct
ECONOMICA 386, 395 (1937)).
108
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777-78, 783-84 (1972).
109
See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
30, 61, 95-96 (1985); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
110
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. F IN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976).
111
Hart, supra note 107, at 1764-65.
112
See generally Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the
Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120-25 (1990); Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The
Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61-133 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs
and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 691 (1986).
113
Hart, supra note 107, at 1766.
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employer only, the contractual arrangement between a direct employer
and another firm, or the outside firm. 114 A supplier-purchaser relationship
between General Motors and Fisher Body, an entity that supplies GM with
car bodies, illustrates this point. 115 If GM and Fisher are separate
companies, a Fisher employee’s incentives to invest in improvements
specific to Fisher or GM will depend on which company owns the assets.
For example, if Fisher owns the assets, he could invest in improving the
quality of Fisher’s output by learning some aspect of Fisher’s production
process better. If, of all of Fisher’s customers, only GM cares about the
improvement, that employee could increase his value to the Fisher-GM
venture by investing in the improvement and possibly extracting its
benefits with a higher wage or promotion. 116 Since the improvement is
GM-specific, the employee incurs lower costs negotiating directly with
GM both because GM is the party that benefits from the employee’s
increased skill and because negotiating with Fisher would require Fisher
in turn to bargain with GM and the employee would capture a lower share
of the surplus Fisher decides to parlay, reducing the employee’s overall
incentive to make the improvement. 117
The employee benefits, and thus his incentives to make the investment
increase, the lower the number of possible hold-ups: if Fisher owns the
assets, two hold-ups-----Fisher’s denial of the employee’s access to the
assets and GM declining to pay more for the improved product-----make it
likely that the employee at best receives a third of his increased marginal
product. With GM management controlling the assets, there is only one
hold-up: GM’s power to deny the employee his increased marginal
product rests solely in one agent’s hands, making it likely that the
employee at best receives half of his increased marginal product.
However, if the improvement is non-GM-specific and reduces Fisher’s
costs of production regardless of Fisher’s final customer, we reach the
opposite conclusion: the hold-ups are reduced by giving Fisher control and
increased if GM, the indirect recipient, were given control. 118 An
employee’s incentives to make improvements specific to either company
are also low where the assets are jointly owned because the number of
114
115
116
117
118
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parties with hold-up power will always be two. 119 This illustration
demonstrates how property rights over physical assets can affect control
over human assets because the owner of the physical assets has more
leverage over the worker: it can deprive the employee of the assets he
works with and hire others to work with them. 120
*

*

*

These developments in the theory of the firm literature introduce
critical insights for secondary activity analysis. First, it makes clear that
wages and terms and conditions of work are not exclusively determined by
who directly controls the employee, but by a broader set of factors: the
transaction costs of contracting inside the firm and in the external market
(including agency and monitoring costs), the nexus of contracts within
which workers provide services, and the ownership and property rights of
direct employers and their contracting parties. Second, these developments
highlight the ways in which firm decisions, whether internal or in the
marketplace, impact worker bargaining power relative to employers
regarding the division of ex post surplus not only in their direct
relationships, but through employer bargains with contracting parties.
D. Developments in Labor Economics and Antitrust Policy
Finally, the NLRB and the courts have ignored the effect of indirect
employer monopsony power and monopsonistic competition in markets
with multiple employers on employee wages when distinguishing
‘‘primaries’’ from ‘‘secondaries.’’ This is an area of growing study and
concern in both the economic and antitrust literature. 121 Monopsony power
is the inverse of monopoly power, or the ability to charge higher prices
119

Id. at 1770.
Id. at 1770-71.
121
Joan Robinson coined the term ‘‘monopsony’’ to describe employer market power
over wages. See JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 1-12
(1969). For more recent accounts, see, e.g., MANNING, supra note 88, at 1-28; LLOYD
REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 76-77 (8th ed. 1982); Orley C.
Ashenfelter, Henry Farber & Michael R. Ransom, Labor Market Monopsony, 28 J. LAB.
ECON. 203, 203-10 (2010); Alan Manning, Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market, in
4 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, at 973-1041; Venkatarman Bhaskar and Ted To,
Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic
Competition, 109 E CON. J. 190-203 (1999); Kenneth Burdett & Dale Mortensen, Wage
Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment, 39 INT’L ECON. REV. 257-73 (1998).
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for a product. 122 Firms with monopsony power have the ability to pay
lower prices for inputs without losing sellers to competition from other
firms buying the same or similar product. 123 In the labor market,
monopsonistic employers can pay lower wages to workers than would
otherwise prevail in a competitive market without losing those workers to
competing employers. As with monopoly, monopsony power can lead to
economic inefficiencies, and in the labor market, to redistribution from
workers to employers. 124 This is because, in an otherwise competitive
labor market, firms would bid wages up to recruit workers from other
firms as long as the revenue they could earn by hiring another worker
exceeds the wage it must pay, tracking as closely as possible wages and
worker productivity, or the worker’s value-added. If a firm bids too low
for a worker’s wages in a perfectly competitive market, the worker would
find alternative employment, so competitive firms would all need to pay
market wages and compensation would equalize across similarly
productive workers for similar types of jobs. 125 However, when there is
imperfect competition, firms with monopsony power are incentivized to
employ fewer workers at a lower wage than they would in a competitive
labor market because what they lose in reduced output and revenue they
can make up for in reduced labor costs by paying lower wages. 126
Monopsonistic employers can thus recoup labor and recruitment costs,
shifting the benefits of production from wages to profits. 127
Economists and policymakers increasingly recognize the existence of
employer monopsony power in labor markets based on direct evidence of
collusion between employers and non-compete agreements as well as
indirect evidence of minimum wage impacts on employment, wagesetting, and wage discrimination. 128 The Department of Justice and class
122

See, e.g., MANNING, supra note 88, at 1-28; PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 575 (3d ed. 2006); ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1-2 (2010) (defining monopsony power
and lamenting the ‘‘scant attention in most antitrust casebooks and texts’’); see also
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 320 (2007)
(defining monopsony power as ‘‘market power on the buy side of the market’’).
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Consequences, and Policy Responses, 2 (CEA Issue Brief, Oct. 2016).
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Id. at 2; MANNING, supra note 88, at 29-32.
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action litigants have brought suit against major Silicon Valley employers,
hospital and sports associations for artificially suppressing the wages of
high-tech employees, nurses, mixed martial arts fighters and others,
through no-poaching agreements, collusive wage-setting and unlawful
monopsony acquisition and maintenance. 129 An estimated 18 percent of the
U.S. labor force is covered by non-compete agreements based on recent
survey evidence. 130 Indirect evidence of monopsonistic wage-setting is also
strong. Beginning in the 1990s, economists began finding that minimum
wage increases were not accompanied by job loss, indicating that wages
have not been bid up to the marginal value of labor. 131 Empirical evidence
also indicates that workers’ quit rates are less responsive to wage changes
than would be expected if labor markets were competitive, suggesting that
employers can set wages significantly below what would prevail in a
competitive market without losing their workforce. 132 Employment
restructuring is a critical component of firms’ ability to engage in wage
discrimination by outsourcing and subcontracting away from internal
equity constraints. 133
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1943 (1985).
See, e.g., Sarah Cwiek, Detroit Medical Center Agrees to Settle with Nurses,
NPR MICH. RADIO (Sept. 14, 2015); Lance Whitney, Apple, Google, Others Settle
Antipoaching Lawsuit for $415 million, CNET (Sept. 3, 2015); Seth Rosenblatt, Judge
Approves First Payout in Antitrust Wage-Fixing Lawsuit, CNET (May 16, 2014); Press
Release, Dep’t of Just. Off. of Pub. Aff., Justice Department Requires eBay to End
Anticompetitive ‘‘No Poach’’ Hiring Agreements (May 1, 2014); Press Release, Dep’t of
Just. Off. of Pub. Aff., Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop
Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010); Roger
D. Blair & Christina DePasquale, Monopsony and Countervailing Power in the Market
for Nurses, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON. (Dec. 2010); Press Release, Dep’t of
Just. Off. of Pub. Aff., Justice Department Reaches Settlement with the Arizona Hospital
and Healthcare Association and its Subsidiary (May 22, 2007). Prevalence of noncompete agreements among workers unlikely to have trade secrets is also evidences
monopsony power. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS. OFFICE OF ECON. POL’Y, NON-COMPETE
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 4, 11-12 (March 2016).
130
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131
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WOLFSON, WHAT DOES THE MINIMUM WAGE DO? 1-18 (2014); Arindrajit Dube, T.
William Lester & Michael Reich, Minimum Wage Shocks, Employment Flows and Labor
Market Frictions, 34 J. LAB. ECON. 663-704 (2016).
132
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There is also evidence that employer discretion over workers’ wages
may be rising due to rising market concentration, declining labor market
dynamism, and the decline of unions and the federal minimum wage. 134
Between 1997 and 2012, there has been a steady increase of product
market concentration in the U.S. economy, where the majority of
industries have seen increases in revenue share by the 50 largest firms. 135
Rising concentration can impact labor markets by expanding each
individual firm’s monopsony power, facilitating collusion, and increasing
barriers to entry. 136 Labor market dynamism, or the frequency of changes
in who is working for whom, has also been in a pattern of long-term
decline, suggesting that incumbents are shielded from competitive upward
pressure on wages and an increase in job-switching costs for noncontingent workers. 137 Finally, with union density in the private sector at a
historic low, and the real value of the federal minimum wage declining 24
percent since its peak of $9.55 (in 2015 dollars) in 1968, there are reduced
checks to employer wage-setting power. 138
Integrating the distorting effects of monopsony power and
oligopsonistic collusion on wage suppression is necessary for evaluating
labor market impacts on worker bargaining power and any resulting
efficiency and distributional effects. 139 Without assessing which firms in
Janitors and Guards, 63 INDUS. LAB. RELATIONS REV. 287, 288-306 (2010) (finding a
‘‘wage penalty’’ of 4%-7% for janitors working as contractors as opposed to working
directly for an employer); Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers:
Violations of Employment in Labor Laws in America’s Cities, CENTER FOR URBAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS CHICAGO / NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
LAW PROJECT / UCLA INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, at 29-39
(2009) (reporting workplace violations by industry based on survey results); Samuel
Berlinski, Wages and Contracting Out: Does the Law of One Price Hold?, 46 BRIT. J. OF
INDUS. REL. 59 (2008) (finding that janitors who worked as contractors earned 15% less
than those working in-house).
134
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135
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136
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137
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Labor Market, BROOKINGS PAPER ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 183-88 (2016); Steven J.
Davis & John Haltiwanger, Labor Market Fluidity and Economic Performance 1-3
(NBER Working Paper No. 20479, 2014).
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Members-----2016, supra note 20.
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fact have the power to determine wages, the purpose, function and success
of a collective bargaining framework for negotiating wages becomes
shadow puppetry. Antitrust scholars, economists, and the courts have
developed a range of mechanisms for measuring harm resulting from an
employer’s monopsony power or monopsonistic competition, whether
through unilateral conduct or through agreement, providing economic
modeling that can be used in adjudication to determine whether workers
suffer lower wages due to monopsony power or monopsonistic
competition in the labor market. 140
Monopsony power by an indirect employer can be directly shown with
evidence that that employer can depress wages below the competitive level
by withholding the purchase of labor inputs and not losing the sellers of
those inputs to other purchasers or employers. 141 Monopsony power can
also be shown indirectly with evidence of an indirect employers’ market
share in a relevant geographic market for labor inputs protected by entry
barriers. 142 Courts have found a 20% market share to be sufficient to infer
buyer market power over sellers of labor inputs. 143 But even buyers with
low market shares can exert significant market power over sellers to the
extent that sellers are more dependent on buyers than buyers on sellers. 144
For example, high-volume retailers have tremendous leverage over
suppliers, especially where the market for particular products is relatively
small but benefits from resale in high-distribution, nationally-scaled
businesses like Amazon.com or Wal-Mart are significant. 145 There is a
Twain Shall Meet? Connecting Popular and Professional Visions for Antitrust
Enforcement, Presentation at GLOBAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT SYMPOSIUM (Sept. 20,
2016) (emphasizing that antitrust enforcement ‘‘benefit[s] workers, whose wages won’t
be driven down by dominant employers with the power to dictate terms of
employment’’).
140
See infra at IV.B.
141
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007)
(‘‘monopoly power may be proven through direct evidence of supracompetitive prices
and restricted output.’’); see also Samuel Muehlemann, Paul Ryan & Stefan C. Wolter,
Monopsony Power, Pay Structure and Training, 66 ILR REV. 1097, 1097-98 (2013)
(discussing direct and indirect evidence of monopsony power).
142
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 229 (6th
ed. 2007).
143
Toys ‘‘R’’ Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000).
144
Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 EMORY L.J.
1509, 1538-39 (2013).
145
Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co. , 290 F.3d 768, 776-77 (6th Cir. 2002);
Stucke, supra note 144, at 1538-39; see also Barry C. Lynn, Breaking the Chain: The
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strong consensus that market share thresholds alone are insufficient to find
monopsony power, and courts should thus consider interrelated factors
such as ‘‘upward sloping or somewhat inelastic supply curve[s] in the
input market’’ and ‘‘an inability or unwillingness for new purchasers to
enter the market or current purchasers to expand the amount of their
purchases in the market.’’146 An employer’s market share can be
determined as the percentage of its share in either dollars or units of its
labor input purchases; the elasticity of fringe demand can be the capacity
of alternative buyers to purchase the labor inputs ‘‘without undue delay,
risk, or cost’’ (including barriers to entry); and the elasticity of supply can
be determined by the workers’ ability and incentive to switch to selling
other services. 147 Where employees are less responsive to wage changes
than would be expected in a competitive labor market, economists infer
evidence of monopsony power. 148 Further, evidence of worker search
costs, labor market frictions, ‘‘job lock,’’ information asymmetries and
barriers to market price discovery, immobile benefits, and regulatory or
other barriers to worker mobility can support a finding of monopsony
power. 149
Where multiple employers collude on wages and agree to fix wages,
employer conduct is per se unlawful and litigants need not establish that
anticompetitive harms outweigh any procompetitive benefits from
agreement. 150 Where agreements are not directly evidenced, they can be
inferred through circumstantial evidence of market concentration, industry
structures, firm histories, employer collusion (such as through noAntitrust Case Against Wal-Mart, HARPER’S MAGAZINE 29-36 (July 2006).
146
Spring Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc. , 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 324 (D.D.C. 2011); see
also BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 122, at 58.
147
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 122, at 58-59; DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES 32-33 (2010).
148
Arindrajit Dube, Laura Giuliano & Jonathan Leonard, Fairness and Frictions:
The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior 1-5 (IZA Discussion Paper 9149, 2015)
(finding quit rates unresponsive among sales employees at a large retail firm); Douglas
O. Staiger, Joanne Spetz & Ciaran S. Phibbs, Is There Monopsony in the Labor Market?
Evidence From a Natural Experiment, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 211, 212-36 (2010) (inferring
employer monopsony power by lower quit responses among registered nurses).
149
CEA, Labor Monopsony Power, supra note 130, at 5-10; Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 A. ECON. REV. 460, 461
(2002).
150
See, e.g., DOJ ANTITRUST DIV. & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN
RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3 (2016); U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
218 (1940) (price-fixing agreements unlawful per se under Sherman Act).
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poaching agreements and coordinating wage offers), and market
environments that are conducive to and/or facilitate collusion. 151 Other
‘‘plus factors’’ indicating agreement include: actions contrary to an
employer’s self-interest; evidence of employers’ regular communication;
industry performance data suggesting successful coordination; and the
absence of a plausible business rationale for suspicious conduct. 152
The core evidence of harm to workers from employer monopsony
power is artificially suppressed wages. 153 Evidence of artificially
suppressed wages can be determined through econometric regressions
comparing existing wage conditions to a ‘‘but-for’’ world where wages
would be competitive within the same labor market. 154 Economists usually
utilize a benchmark or yardstick approach comparing existing wages to
those before the anticompetitive conduct occurred (say, prior to the
merger of two defendant firms) or in comparison to a similar industry with
similar labor market conditions to ascertain the marginal revenue product
(MRP), the value that an employee creates for his or her employer in
competitive conditions. 155 For example, in a case alleging that hospitals in
the Albany area colluded to suppress registered nurses’ wages, economic
expert testimony was offered to show that wages of agency nurses in the
same geographic market, argued to be interchangeable with registered
nurses they worked alongside performing the same tasks on the same
days, was the appropriate benchmark for comparing registered nurses’
wages, and agency nurse wages exceeded the registered nurses’ wages. 156

151

RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 55-93 (2d ed. 2001) (collecting and
analyzing ‘‘plus factors’’); see generally, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (to infer agreement, ‘‘there must be evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility of independent action by the [parties].’’).
152
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 310-11 (2d ed. 2008); William E. Kovacic et
al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 405-6 (2011).
153
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 122, at 310-21 (discussing economic harms
resulting from monopsony).
154
Roger D. Blair & Jessica S. Haynes, Monopsony, Monopsony Power, and
Antitrust Policy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 256-7
& n.14 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012).
155
Id. at 255-56 (discussing Lerner Index of measuring market power); Daniel L.
Rubinfield, Antitrust Damages, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 154, at 381
(describing benchmark and yardstick approaches).
156
See Fleischman v. Albany Medical Center, 728 F. Supp. 2d 130, 145-57
(N.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing expert testimony on behalf of plaintiff nurses).
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Developments in labor economics and antitrust policy have
significantly advanced both theoretical and empirical tools for assessing
when indirect employers have sufficient power to artificially suppress
indirect employees’ wages. Labor law could dramatically benefit from
utilizing these tools in determining employers’ market power for the
purposes of distinguishing between primaries and secondaries, and more
broadly, to ensure that workers have protections to effectuate the purposes
of the labor law.
III.

PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LAW IN THE NEW ECONOMY

Integrating developments in the New Economy and economic theory
into evaluations of existing labor regulation can provide a clearer view of
when those regulations are not achieving the labor law’s purposes and
when reforms are needed. Further, perhaps more surprisingly, it can offer
a way out of viewing the labor law’s expressive, microeconomic and
macroeconomic goals as necessarily conflicting. Instead, economic theory
suggests that the regulation of secondary activity can be recalibrated to
achieve all of these purposes. This Section elaborates those principles, and
applying the insights from the prior Section, explains how current law on
the primary-secondary distinction fails under them.
A. Unified Principles for Evaluating Labor Law Rules
Judge Richard Posner is not the first to view labor law as ‘‘founded on
a policy that is the opposite of the policies of competition and economic
efficiency that most economists support.’’157 But labor regulation is not
inherently inefficient. Rather, it is best conceived as achieving three
socially beneficial outcomes on a sliding scale: (1) enhancing expressive
and associational rights at work (‘‘First Amendment protections’’); (2)
minimizing inefficient resource allocations to ensure the stabilization of
competitive wages (‘‘microeconomic policy’’); and (3) achieving the
distributional
goals
of
enhancing
mass
purchasing
power
(‘‘macroeconomic policy’’).

157

Posner, supra note 28, at 990. See also RICHARD B. F REEMAN & JAMES L.
MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 3 & 261 n.1 (1984) (summarizing negative economic
literature on unions).
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Fig. 1. Overlapping Principles for Evaluating Labor Law’s Success
First, since its inception, labor law has been committed to promoting
workers’ expressive and associational rights. 158 These rights operate as an
‘‘analogue[] to the First Amendment and the ‘Republican Form of
Government’ clause.’’159 There are strong normative reasons to promote
this foundational concern of the labor law as not only fundamental to selfexpression and self-determination but also to social and political wellbeing. 160 Worker voice can have positive effects on worker productivity
and the social welfare by ‘‘articulating the preferences and internal tradeoffs of workers; improving communications between workers and
management; fostering due process and restricting the capricious actions
of managers; reducing quits; and ‘shocking’ management into more
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (granting workers right to self-organization and ‘‘to
form, join, or assist labor organizations’’); 78 Cong. Rec. 12017 (June 16, 1934)
(statement of Sen. Wagner) (arguing that members of Congress had recognized ‘‘full
freedom of association and self-organization among workers was desirable’’); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 517-18 (1939) (holding that union organizers had First Amendment
right to speak to workers about NLRA rights).
159
CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER 135 (2003) (analogizing the animating
vision of the Wagner Act to a ‘‘basic charter of civil liberties and a form of workplace
democracy available at the option of a majority of the workforce’’).
160
Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights
after Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1075 (2013); see also
ESTLUND, supra note 159, at 3-21 (arguing that ‘‘what happens in the workplace is
extraordinarily important in a diverse democratic society’’); Joseph Fishkin & William E.
Forbath, Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 671, 673-90 (2014) (discussing
value of self-rule in constitutional thought).
158
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efficient work practices.’’161 Worker voice benefits employers by
‘‘improving morale, enhancing loyalty and commitment, reducing costly
turnover, ensuring the receipt of deferred compensation and providing
information to employers.’’162
Second, the NLRA was intended to ‘‘stabiliz[e] . . . competitive wage
rates,’’163 and failing to evaluate the microeconomic effects of labor
regulation neglects that key purpose by ignoring regulatory impacts on
inefficient resource allocation and labor market failures. For example,
where labor regulation results in enhanced employer monopsony power,
which in turn can result in artificially suppressed wages, it can result in
reduced output, the exit or failure of entry of the most productive
workers, a weakened link between labor productivity and wages, and
other adverse effects on firm-specific institutions (for example, on
grievance procedures and incentive structures that keep firm-specific skills
in the firm). 164 Efficient bargains in the workplace can also reduce labor
unrest. 165 Insights from the behavioral economics literature highlight the
significance of workers’ perceptions of wage fairness, not only with
respect to their own wage but with respect and relative to others’ wages,
on productivity and high-quality job performance. 166
Third, distributional goals of increasing wage earners’ purchasing
power in the context of depressed wage rates was an essential
macroeconomic policy goal of the NLRA. 167 This purpose is all the more
161

Morley Gunderson, Two Faces of Union Voice in the Public Sector, in WHAT DO
UNIONS DO? A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 401 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman
eds. 2007).
162
Id.
163
29 U.S.C. § 151.
164
For full discussion of the adverse microeconomic effects of employer monopsony
power, see infra Section III.B.2.
165
Eric A. Posner, Four Economic Perspectives on American Labor Law and the
Problem of Social Conflict, 159 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 101, 103, 106-107, 11315 (2003) (arguing that labor law can promote conflict resolution and order); DauSchmidt, supra note 30, at 491-93 (1992) (arguing that measures to reduce strikes
maximize welfare).
166
See WEIL, supra note 11, at 81-83 (summarizing behavioral economics literature);
BEWLEY, supra note 97, at 81 (1999) (explaining existence of pay equity structures and
nominal wage rigidity on fairness grounds); Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and
Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,
76 AMER. ECON. REV. 728, 739-40 (1986) (finding fairness constraints apply to wagesetting).
167
See infra Section I.A.
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relevant in light of the dramatic rise in inequality following the Reagan
administration’s deregulation of labor markets. 168 Two critical
restructurings within human-resource management practices have
contributed to what Paul Krugman has called the ‘‘Great Divergence’’ in
American income inequality: the ‘‘financialization’’ of the firm and the
‘‘fissuring’’ of the American workplace. 169 First, the transformation of the
American firm to prioritize maximizing shareholder returns has deeply
altered the firm’s relationship with its employees, incentivizing the
systematic deployment of labor-cost minimization to satisfy profitability
constraints while making flexible temporary work arrangements more
attractive. 170 This shift in human resource management has corresponded
with a continuous rise in labor productivity, wage stagnation, and
increased returns to shareholders. 171 While worker productivity is
estimated to have grown 64.9 percent between 1979 and 2013, hourly
compensation has only increased by 8.2 percent. 172
Second, the vertical disintegration and ‘‘fissuring’’ of lead company
production, distribution, and employment, including how firms hire,
evaluate, pay, supervise, train and coordinate labor inputs, has become a

168

WEILER, supra note 15, at 18-22 (discussing distributional effects of Reagan
administration’s deregulatory policies).
169
See generally WEIL, supra note 11, at 281; PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF
A LIBERAL 5 (2007); MICHEL AGLIETTA & ANTOINE REBÉRIOUX, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ADRIFT: A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 1-20 (2005).
170
See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, REWRITING THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 33-36 (2015) (describing ‘‘shareholder revolution’’ and corresponding rise in
executive compensation relative to worker pay); Ken-Hou Lin & Donald TomaskovicDevey, Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality, 1970-2008, 118 AM. J. SOC. 1284,
1285-329 (2013) (discussing effects of financialization on inequality); Gerald F. Davis,
Shareholder Value and the Jobs Crisis, 17 PERSP. ON WORK 47-50 (2013) (detailing
relationship between prioritizing shareholder value and the decline in job growth);
Forrest Briscoe & Chad Murphy, Sleight of Hand? Practice Opacity, Third-Party
Responses, and the Interorganizational Diffusion of Controversial Practices, 57 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 553-84 (2012) (describing reduction of retiree health benefits in shareholderoriented firms); Neil Fligstein & Taekjin Shin, Shareholder Value and the
Transformation of the U.S. Economy, 1984-2000, 22 SOC. F. 399-424 (2007).
171
STIGLITZ, supra note 170, at 43; Josh Bivens & Lawrence Mishel, Understanding
the Historic Divergence Between Productivity and a Typical Worker’s Pay 4 & Fig. A
(EPI Briefing Paper No. 406, 2015) (charting increased gap between productivity and
typical worker’s compensation between 1948 and 2014).
172
Josh Bivens, Elise Gould, Lawrence Mishel & Heidi Shierholz, Raising America’s
Pay 9-10 (EPI Briefing Paper No. 378, 2014); Bivens & Mishel, supra note 171, at 4.
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mainstream means of shedding wage-setting costs for employment. 173
Gains to firms from both restructurings have disproportionately benefited
executives and their investors at the expense of workers’ wages. 174 In fact,
in his seminal account of the rise of income inequality, Thomas Piketty
explains the 45-50 percent increase in the top decile’s share of U.S.
national income as resulting from ‘‘a veritable separation of the top
managers of large firms from the rest of the population,’’ those who have
high bargaining power to set their own remuneration and those who do
not. 175 The share of corporate-sector income going to labor compensation
rather than corporate profits since 2000 is at historic lows, estimated at
$535 billion less for workers. 176 In addition to these restructurings,
declining union density has removed a critical countermechanism of
achieving more equitable wealth distribution through asserting real
bargaining leverage against employers. 177 Declining unionization is
estimated to account for between a fifth and a third of the increase in
inequality since the 1970s. 178 This adverse macroeconomic distribution can
result in underconsumption, persistent unemployment and deflation. 179
Measuring the impact of labor regulation on workers’ diminished share of
the pie can be a crucial means for servicing the needs of macroeconomic
policy.
*

*

*

Putting these three policy goals together, a unifying set of principles
for evaluating labor regulation thus favors rules that:
173

WEIL, supra note 11, at 1-26, 281-82; see infra at Section II.A.
WEIL, supra note 11, at 282; Bivens et al., supra note 172, at 7-8, 12, 25, 51-53;
Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States,
Working
Paper,
UC-Berkeley
1-5
(2013),
available
at
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2011.pdf.
175
PIKETTY, supra note 17, at 23-24, 294-96, 314-15.
176
JOSH BIVENS, TRIPLE THREAT TO WORKERS AND HOUSEHOLDS-----IMPACTS OF
F EDERAL REGULATIONS ON JOBS, WAGES, AND STARTUPS, H.R. Doc. No. 114-65, at 8
& 10, Fig. 7 (2016). See also KRUGMAN, supra note 169, at 54-55 (2007).
177
TITO BOERI & JAN VAN OURS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT LABOR MARKETS
63-94 (2008).
178
LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 6-8 (12th ed.
2012); CEA, Labor Market Monopsony, supra note 124, at 10-12; Bruce Western & Jake
Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV.
513, 514-37 (2011).
179
See Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power: Changes Over
Time and Implications for Public Policy, 10 J. LAB. RES. 285, 291-92 (1989).
174
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1) Are more protective of worker expression and
association in the workplace with little or no
constraints on employer expression;
2) Are Kaldor-Hicks optimal, 180 effectuating efficient
resource allocation and wage-setting; and
3) Further macroeconomic distributional policy goals of
reducing inequality and increasing mass purchasing
power.
The advantage of the unified principles is that they establish a
framework for evaluating the labor law’s competing purposes in a nonoppositional manner, inviting both information about and evaluation of
any and all relevant effects of labor regulations while also allowing for a
more informed conversation on how to judge the preferability of certain
labor rules over others. The principles provide a framework for assessing
how the various dimensions of a law’s effects interact. Further, they avoid
a myopic focus on one perspective of the benefits or detriments of labor
regulation over others, and by doing so, demand broader evaluation of
each of the social values at stake in labor policy.
B. Current Secondary Picketing Law Fails Under the Unified Principles
While the coercive potential of secondary activity on employers and
non-union employees is a legitimate concern, current regulation of
secondary activity is overinclusive in designating employers that have
market power to determine wages and terms and conditions of
employment as ‘‘secondaries’’ ‘‘wholly unconcerned’’ with the labor
dispute. 181 By reducing worker bargaining power as against direct
employers and transactional primaries, the current legal standards for
distinguishing primaries from ‘‘neutrals’’ or ‘‘secondaries’’ are deficient
under the unified principles.
Resolution of a bargain or conflict is ‘‘Kaldor-Hicks optimal’’ relative to the status
quo where a hypothetical, costless redistribution from those who benefit to those who do
not would make no one worse off. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 1.2 (9th ed. 2014); ROBIN W. BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS
97-99 (1984).
181
STONE, supra note 26, at 210-12 (arguing that current exceptions to secondary
boycott rule are too narrow); Harper, supra note 29, at 330, 338, 348 (rejecting
overbroad exemption of employers reliant on contingent workers from collective
bargaining obligations).
180
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First, the sweeping application of the ban unduly obstructs worker
expression and association in the workplace. 182 Second, the overbroad
demarcation decreases worker bargaining power, which can result in
inefficient wages. Prohibiting lawful targeting and economic pressure on
all wage-determining employers prevents workers from countering the
adverse effects of employers’ market power on their wage determinations
and terms and conditions of work. Finally, current law obstructs the labor
law’s macroeconomic goals by favoring distributional gains to employers
at the expense of employees. Left unchecked, employers’ externalization
of labor costs are borne by society and taxpayers in the form of increased
coordination costs, declining consumer purchasing power, increased
burdens on the social safety net, and increased health problems and
domestic instability associated with poverty wages. 183 Much as the social
and political consequences of market concentration are getting a new
airing in antitrust policy, the NLRA’s stated purposes of ‘‘equality of
bargaining power’’ and ‘‘the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions’’ deserve a reinvigoration, both theoretically and
pragmatically, to ensure that the distributive and macroeconomic
objectives of the labor law can be achieved. 184
182

The Supreme Court has directly upheld the ban as not violative of the First
Amendment against objections of dissenting judges and scholars alike. See, e.g., Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951) (declaring Section
8(b)(4) does not constitutionally abridge free speech); but see NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 76-80 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Section 8(b)(4) ‘‘abridges freedom of speech and press in violation of the First
Amendment.’’). Current law requires that, because Section 8(b)(4) addresses ‘‘expressive
activity,’’ it must be construed narrowly to avoid First Amendment concerns. Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 576
(1988).
183
See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 11, at 18-20; SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO ET AL., F AST
F OOD, POVERTY WAGES (Oct. 15, 2013) (estimating costs of public assistance for fastfood workers at roughly $7 billion a year).
184
29 U.S.C. § 151; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 468, 503 (1940) (stating
that national labor policy promotes ‘‘elimination of price competition based on
differences in labor standards’’). For antitrust scholarship emphasizing the relationship
between market concentration and inequality, see, e.g., JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS,
MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES 1-38 (2014); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan,
Market Power and Inequality, 11 HARV. LAW & POL’Y REV. 1, 5-36 (2016); Marc
Jarsulic, Ethan Gurwitz, Kate Bahn & Andy Green, Reviving Antitrust: Why Our
Economy Needs a Progressive Competition Policy, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
(June
29,
2016),
available
at:
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2016/06/ 29/140613/reviving-
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Fig. 2. Overlapping Interests in Regulating Secondary Activity
An example from the janitorial services market, a market that typifies
the complexities of New Economy workplace structures, clarifies these
limitations. Janitors were traditionally employed directly by building
owners but are now overwhelmingly: (1) employed (and often
misclassified) as independent contractors; 185 (2) employed by independent
janitorial firms that contract with building owners; or (3) employed as
individual franchisees in larger franchised companies like Jani-King
International. 186 Contractual agreements between janitorial firms and
building owners or between franchisees and franchisors generally reflect
the weaker bargaining power of the former relative to the latter due to the
competitive market for spun-off janitorial services: pricing is based on
price-for-service provisions without reference to hours worked; janitorial
workers, whether as employees of janitorial firms or as franchisees, do
not directly negotiate with building owners regarding terms and conditions
of work; and franchisees are required to pay initial franchisor fees,
purchase cleaning materials from franchisors, and pay ongoing royalty and
management fees that make it so difficult to break even that the industry

antitrust/; but see Daniel Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
1171 (2016).
185
See, e.g., Stephen Lerner, Jill Hurst & Glenn Adler, Fighting and Winning in the
Outsourced Economy, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY, at 243-67 (Annette Bernhardt et
al. eds., 2008) (describing prevalence of janitorial employee independent contractor
misclassification).
186
WEIL, supra note 11, at 132-42 (describing rise and effects of shift from direct
janitorial employment to franchising).
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has an annual turnover rate of 15%. 187 Given the very narrow margins in
the industry, it is unsurprising that violations of labor standards are
widespread, with 22-26% of workers reporting minimum wage violations
and 63-71% reporting failure to receive overtime pay. 188 Recognizing the
limited bargaining power of direct employer independent janitorial firms,
and unable to negotiate better wages, terms and conditions from those
employers, janitorial workers have increasingly turned to placing
economic pressure on building owners and franchisors that contract with
their direct employers. 189 In the late 1980s, the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU)’s Justice for Janitors campaign began the first
nationwide effort to organize janitors and extend peaceful picketing
beyond direct employers to building owners and building management
companies. 190 The picketing strategy came under quick fire as unlawful
secondary activity. 191 For example, the SEIU picketed several
Washington, D.C. building owners and building management companies
that had contracted with two independent janitorial firms. 192 The building
owners, managers and maintenance contractors then formed a trade
association with the janitorial firms to ‘‘formulat[e] a strategy to counter
the Union’s efforts,’’ directly supporting and financing the direct
employers’ antiunion campaign through a strike fund invoiced ‘‘to counter
the SEIU’s organizational campaign.’’193 When the janitors picketed
buildings owned or managed by trade association members, the trade
association and its two most active indirect employers sought relief under
Section 8(b)(4). The majority of the Board found the picketing unlawful
because it was ‘‘‘tactically calculated to satisfy [the union’s] objectives
elsewhere,’ i.e., to organize the primary employers’ employees,’’ and
187

Id. at 134-41 (collecting and summarizing franchisor-franchisee agreements and
turnover rates).
188
Id. at 132-42 (discussing violations of labor standards in janitorial services
sector); Dube & Kaplan, supra note 133, at 287-306 (finding ‘‘wage penalty’’ of 4%-7%
between contracted-for and directly employed janitors).
189
See, e.g., Williams v. Jani-King of Phila., Inc., No. 15-2049, 2016 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17223 (3d Cir. Sept. 21, 2016) (holding that janitors working as Jani-King
‘‘franchisees’’ may pursue misclassification class action).
190
Lydia Savage, Justice for Janitors: Scales of Organizing and Representing
Workers, 38 ANTIPODE 645-666 (2006) (discussing Justice for Janitors campaign); see
also STONE, supra note 26, at 211-12 (discussing negative impact of secondary boycott
ban on Justice for Janitors campaign).
191
See, e.g., Serv. Emp. Int’l Union (SEIU), AFL-CIO, and Gen. Maint. Serv. Co. ,
329 N.L.R.B. 638, 638-42 (1999); id. at 644-50 (dissenting opinion).
192
Id.
193
Id.
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because the union failed to establish that the ‘‘secondaries’’ lost their
neutrality under the ally or single employer doctrines. 194
The next Subsections discuss in detail how the ban, illustrated by the
above example, decreases worker bargaining power, resulting in adverse
effects on workers’ expressive and associational rights, workers’ ability to
earn an efficient wage, and the achievement of labor law’s macroeconomic
distributional goals.
1. Current Law Decreases Worker Bargaining Power
Labor law, as it has evolved, creates a structural imbalance in
bargaining power between employees and employers by granting a
broader set of economic tools and self-help protections to employers than
employees in labor disputes. 195 Employers can: permanently replace
striking workers; prohibit discussion of unionization in a wide range of
circumstances; limit union access to employees; refuse to bargain
collectively on permissive subjects of bargaining, which include
outsourcing and plant closures; discharge workers engaged in concerted
activity for insubordination or disloyalty; and enjoin unions to cease
striking pending arbitration, to list a few. 196 Employers may also engage in
self-help, including lockouts as well as terminating and suspending
workers, when employee activity is unprotected. Employees’ right to
strike, their ultimate economic weapon, has been sharply curtailed as
unprotected in a wide range of contexts. For example, employees cannot:
strike in favor of permissive subjects of bargaining; strike to modify
collective bargaining agreements; strike when a no-strike clause is present
194

Id. at 639-40.
Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure, 55 CHI. L. REV. 73,
86-120 (1988) (detailing aspects of labor law that allocate power between labor and
management); Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J.
472, 472-75 (1980); see also Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (discussing the impact of background
laws of property, inheritance, incorporation and other common law entitlements on
ordinary contract negotiations and outcomes).
196
See First Nat’l Maint., 452 U.S. at 674-80 (holding plant closings permissive
subjects of bargaining); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962) (holding employers
may unilaterally change collective bargaining agreement if they bargained to impasse);
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (holding
employers’ duty to bargain limited to mandatory rather than permissive subjects);
Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345 (holding that employers can permanently replace striking
employees).
195
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or implied in a collective bargaining agreement; strike as a minority
unsanctioned by their union (‘‘wildcat’’ strikes); engage in a slowdown;
refuse to cross picket lines if a no-strike provision bars such refusal; and
get food stamps while on strike. 197 The NLRB and the courts have also set
default rules of contract interpretation that favor employers over
employees, including implying no-strike clauses in collective bargaining
agreements with mandatory arbitration provisions. 198 The decline in union
density coupled with declining access to collective resources to conduct
the obligatory union business in Right-to-Work states has also lessened
union bargaining power in labor disputes. 199 Finally, in practical terms,
delays in NLRB rulings on unfair labor practices and its limited exercise
of its remedial authority have dramatically reduced employees’ bargaining
power at each stage of the recognition and collective bargaining process. 200
The secondary activity ban takes on particular salience in the context
of these background rules impacting worker bargaining power. At the
most general level, it creates a blatant formal inequality in the law by
allowing employer self-help during worker strikes that are not equally
offered to employees, decreasing the potency of those strikes and allowing
See, e.g., Lyng v. Int’l Union, 108 S. Ct. 1184, 1188 (1988) (holding statute
denying food stamp eligibility to striking workers constitutional); Emporium Capwell,
420 U.S. at 60-70 (holding wildcat strikes unprotected); Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350
U.S. 270, 284-89 (1956) (holding strikes to modify collective bargaining agreement with
a no-strike clause unprotected); Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co. , 268
N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066 (1984) (holding that, if mandatory term is not
clearly in collective bargaining agreement and employer bargained to an impasse,
employer can unilaterally act without getting union consent); Elk Lumber Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 333, 337 (1950) (holding slowdowns unprotected); NLRB v. Rockaway News
Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80-81 (1953) (holding employer discharge of union memberemployee for refusal to cross picket line of another union not an unfair labor practice
where collective labor contract contained no-strike provision).
198
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-6 (1962) (holding nostrike clause implied in union-management arbitration agreement).
199
For decline in union density, see supra note 20. As of this writing, 26 states have
adopted right-to-work laws, with Kentucky, Missouri, and New Hampshire poised to
become the next three. Rhonda Smith & Chris Brown, Right-to-Work Bills Move
Forward in Missouri, New Hampshire, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://goo.gl/bHNh0l; Steve Bittenbender, Kentucky Lawmakers Pass ‘‘Right-to-Work’’
Legislation, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kentuckyunions-idUSKBN14R0BN. Whether non-members of public employee unions must pay
dues to cover union administration costs will likely be relitigated before a full Roberts
Court after the Court’s 4-4 tie in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 136 S.
Ct. 1083 (2016).
200
See supra note 84 & accompanying text.
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employers a broader set of resources to ride them out. 201 The prohibition
restricts unions’ outreach to all non-direct employers and their employees
while employers can exercise extensive control over ‘‘neutrals’’ or third
parties by incorporating into contractual agreements with those parties
provisions that ensure their immunity from harm in the event of strikes. 202
Employers thus have more alternatives outside the bargaining relationship
with their employees while employees have none, dramatically
circumscribing employees’ ‘‘best alternatives to a negotiated agreement’’
(BATNA) relative to employers. 203
Further, only allowing workers to economically pressure a single
employer when two or more employers in fact impact wage determinations
reduces worker bargaining power by forbidding use of their strongest
economic weapon as against those indirect employers. Lesser bargaining
power means lower wages and less control over the terms and conditions
of work, including the ability to negotiate better workplace protections and
have collective representation, flexible scheduling, more stable
employment, access to equitable grievance procedures, paid leave policies,
and more. It also means that workers’ ability to gain union recognition and
better terms through collective bargaining as well as to impact their
employers’ decision-making through concerted activity are weaker because
workers can neither picket nor join with indirect employers or their
employees.
It is for this reason that, of all the asymmetries in the labor law
between employers and employees, the ban on secondary picketing has the
largest impact on union density across industries. This is likely the main
motivation behind Richard Trumka’s quip that he would abolish all of the
labor law to be relieved of its secondary boycott ban. 204 The categorical
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Katherine V.W. Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90
YALE L. J. 1509, 1513-14 (1981) (challenging formal equality in bargaining power
between employers and employees).
202
See, e.g., Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345; Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240-55 (1970) (enjoining strike pending arbitration); Kaufman,
supra note 179, at 286-91.
203
Weiler, New Balance, supra note 17, at 415 (arguing that current labor law
unfairly allows employers ‘‘to continue business relations with cooperative outsiders’’
while employees are only permitted to request ‘‘help of sympathetic union members
elsewhere’’). For BATNA, see ROGER F ISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 97-106
(3d ed. 2011).
204
Trumka, supra note 16, at 881.

48

PICKETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY

ban prohibits workers in the New Economy from pressuring indirect
employers and achieving sufficient union density to collectively challenge
wage standards in industries with fragmented employment. This creates a
structural inability for workers to gain equal bargaining power in a range
of New Economy work structures: (1) indirect employer outsourcing or
subcontracting with direct employers; (2) the franchisor-franchisee
relationship; (3) contractors with monopsony power over direct employers
within a supply chain or other corporate arrangement; and (4) horizontal
wage-fixing or tacit collusion on wages in oligopsonistic industries.
a. Outsourcing, Subcontracting and Temporary Employment
The rise of outsourcing and subcontracting has impacted worker
bargaining power in a number of ways. First, it has limited workers’
ability to compel compliance from employers that, prior to outsourcing
and subcontracting, would have been subject to labor and employment
law. 205 To cite the janitorial contracting example, building owners have
avoided legal sanctions for wage-and-hour law violations while also
benefiting from fragmenting the labor force of janitorial service providers
that dramatically increases worker coordination costs for unionization. 206
Further, building owners rely on the creation and persistence of a
competitive market of sellers of janitorial services that cannot coordinate
to increase prices for their contracted-for services under the antitrust laws
and have been driven to race-to-the-bottom wages for their direct
employees. 207

205

WEIL, supra note 11, at 93-178 (discussing compliance effects of business
restructuring).
206
Id. at 136-42.
207
The Sherman Act prohibits ‘‘[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce, ’’ including price-fixing agreements and group boycotts.
15 U.S.C. § 1; FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 421-25
(1990) (holding boycott for compensation increase unlawful as agreement among
competitors); Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1959)
(holding concerted refusals to deal in a group boycott unlawful); Socony-Vacuum Oil,
310 U.S. at 218 (holding unlawful price-fixing agreements per se).
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Fig. 3. Outsourcing and Subcontracting Arrangements
Workers that find themselves in these arrangements have limited
options if they seek to negotiate higher wages from their direct employers.
First, an individual set of workers (say, W1) could strike their direct
employer (B1) to seek recognition as a union, or if they are already
unionized, to negotiate higher wages in a collective bargaining agreement.
They would likely be unsuccessful at increasing their wage where B1 has a
cost-plus contract with A because B1 cannot remain competitive with B2,
B3 and B4 to the extent they have lower labor costs. Thus, if B1 demanded
to renegotiate its contract with A, A would be more incentivized to assign
B1’s contracted services to B2, B3 or B4 to avoid paying higher prices to
B1. If B1 nevertheless agreed to pay higher wages to W1, it could go out of
business.
Second, to the extent the workers (W1, W2, W3 and W4) could
overcome coordination costs to collectively organize rather than compete
with one another, they could use the protections of the labor law to engage
in concerted activity against all of their direct employers, the Bs. 208 The
advantage of striking all of the Bs is that the Bs could then confront A as a
united front to boycott A unless A offers them better terms for the
provision of janitorial services. However, a range of obstacles would
challenge the success of that strategy. First, as in the SEIU case discussed
above, A could collude with the Bs in an anti-union campaign since it is in
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29 U.S.C. § 157 (granting employees right to engage in concerted activities).
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neither of their interests to pay the Ws higher wages. 209 Second, A could
wait out the pressures of cartel maintenance among the Bs or refuse to
renegotiate contracts with any of the Bs. This could be relatively easy for
A, given the very low barriers to entry in the independent janitorial firms
market that currently exist. 210 Third, if the Ws rely on the Bs to agree on a
plan to pressure A, they would have to hope the Bs could overcome high
coordination costs to do so, and even then, the Bs’ conduct could violate
the antitrust laws.
The workers’ final option would be to directly exert economic pressure
on the building owner, A, by picketing its headquarters and the buildings
it owns. This would increase their bargaining power with the Bs because it
would create a picket line pressuring all janitorial service providers from
providing services to A. Directly picketing A would override any
coordination problems between the Bs in pressuring A and would also
overcome the low barrier-to-entry problem in the market for Bs by
blocking new Bs from providing their services to A. Secondarily,
picketing A may bring reputational harm to A, and any tenants or
customers of A may refuse to cross the Ws’ picket lines. That workers are
banned from directly picketing A even if, as an economic matter, A is
setting a cap on their wages thus decreases their bargaining power in
negotiating their wage.
b. Franchising and Independent Contracting
Workers employed by franchisors face many of the same problems as
those employed by subcontractors. This is because, although franchisors
differ from subcontractors in various respects, like subcontractors, they
lack sufficient bargaining power to improve employment terms. In
franchising, the lead franchising firm contracts with franchisees to carry
out its core activities while retaining overall control of brand management.
The secondary activity ban decreases worker bargaining power in the
franchising context in either one of two ways. First, for workers working
directly for franchisees, their bargaining power is decreased for the same
reasons it is decreased in the outsourcing or subcontracting arrangement:
their direct employers lack sufficient bargaining power to improve
employment terms, and workers are unable to bargain over those terms
directly with transactional primaries, the franchisors.
209
210

See supra note 191 & accompanying text.
WEIL, supra note 11, at 136-39.
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Workers in franchising arrangement may also confront a Catch-22.
Instead of franchisors classifying them as ‘‘employees’’ protected by labor
and employment law, they may classify them as independent contractor
‘‘franchisees’’ to which they owe no obligations under that law. In that
circumstance, workers would have to choose to either forfeit the
protections of the NLRA and other employment laws by maintaining a
‘‘misclassified’’ status, which would allow them to engage in a range of
secondary activity much like the CIW workers did, or litigate their
misclassified status and thereby opt into the NLRA’s secondary picketing
ban. 211 That they are prohibited from directly picketing building owners in
the franchising context has the same effect on their bargaining power to
negotiate wages and working conditions as in the outsourcing example.
But the fact that workers may prefer to adopt ‘‘franchisee’’ status only
shows how important evading the secondary activity ban is for them.
c. Contractors with Vertical Monopsony Power
The secondary boycott ban also weakens worker bargaining power in
circumstances where transactional primaries have vertical monopsony
power over direct employers. Vertical monopsony power may occur in
supply-chain structures where a direct employer only buys or sells a
critical supply or distributional service to another employer within a
supply chain. For example, Ford was formerly vertically integrated but
since the late 1960s and early 1970s has vertically disintegrated its supply
chain. 212 Imagine Ford now has contracts with four widget manufacturers
to supply widgets for a specific car model.

29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding independent contractors from ‘‘employee’’
definition).
212
See ISABEL STUDER-NOGUEZ, F ORD AND THE GLOBAL STRATEGIES OF
MULTINATIONALS: THE NORTH AMERICAN AUTO INDUSTRY 98-117 (2003) (detailing
vertical disintegration of Ford’s supply chain).
211
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Fig. 4. Supply-Chain Monopsony Power
Similar to the model depicted in Figure 3, direct employers in this
scenario intermediate between the lead company and their workers, and
the intermediaries are either competitors in the same product market in the
lead company’s supply chain or are complements in product markets with
low barriers to entry. 213 This supply-chain model is duplicated in a range
of settings, from the supply of raw materials, assembly or processing to
manufacturing in the clothing, grocery, and other industries. 214 Where the
lead company has monopsony power, say, because the manufacturer is
producing lead company-specific products and has sunk costs (for
example, by having invested in technology geared exclusively to the lead
company), the intermediary entities have less leverage in renegotiating
their contracts with the lead company because their costs of transferring
production to another product line would be higher. Therefore, just as in
the building-owner example, if Ford sought to lower its contract price
with a widget manufacturer and had monopsony power over that
manufacturer, the manufacturer would have little leverage to negotiate the
contract price up where it is in a competitive market with low barriers to
213

To the extent parts manufacturers produce product market complements and
function as exclusive suppliers to Ford, they would have more bargaining power with
Ford in a worker strike. In that case, workers’ bargaining power would only be weaker
to the extent the manufacturers collude with each other and/or Ford, and then only if the
parts are universal to Ford products. The workers’ bargaining power in relation to Ford
would thus directly depend on the widget manufacturers’ monopoly power relative to
Ford.
214
See Barenberg, Widening the Scope, supra note 76, at 3-10 (describing various
supply chain structures).
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entry. To remain competitive with other widget manufacturers, then, it
would likely cut worker wages, and if workers can only lawfully picket
their direct employer rather than both their direct employer and Ford,
their bargaining power is reduced. Thus, the supply-chain scenario is very
similar to the outsourcing and subcontracting scenario. 215
d. Horizontal Wage-Fixing and Tacit Collusion
Employers may come to a horizontal agreement or tacitly collude to
suppress wages in oligopsonistic industries or specific geographic markets.
As mentioned above, both government and private attorneys general have
targeted such wage-fixing in a range of industries. 216 To the extent
workers may lawfully picket their direct employer in a bargaining dispute
over wages, however, the secondary boycott ban prohibits them from
picketing employers that have either come to wage-fixing or other
agreements with their direct employer that suppress wages, have tacitly
colluded with their direct employer, or rely on labor market-restricting
mechanisms, such as ‘‘no-compete’’ clauses, to keep wages down in a
particular industry. The prohibition thus reduces their bargaining power
relative to their direct employer because they can assert no leverage or
economic pressure over other employers that are effectively colluding with
their direct employer to lower wages.
2. Adverse Effects of Decreased Bargaining Power under Unified
Principles
By decreasing worker bargaining power, the secondary picketing ban
fails under the unified principles for achieving successful labor regulation.
First, excessive prohibition of secondary activity overly restricts otherwise
First Amendment-protected activity. The Supreme Court has long rejected
the view that labor picketing is conduct, and restrictions on labor picketing
are content- and speaker-based restrictions that run contrary to
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence. 217 As a normative matter,
215

For a discussion of whether picketing Ford would effectuate a better wage, see
infra at Section IV.A.
216
See, e.g., U.S. DOJ, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REQUIRES
SIX HIGH TECH COMPANIES TO STOP ENTERING INTO ANTICOMPETITIVE EMPLOYEE
SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS (2010); Blair & DePasquale, supra note 129.
217
See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. , 564 U.S. 552, 563-66 (2011) (holding state law
prohibition of sale of prescriber-identifying information unconstitutional content- and
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the prohibition on secondary activity in the New Economy and under
current workplace arrangements restricts workers’ expression on a critical
aspect of their self-realization within the economic sphere, access to
economic opportunity, and ability to participate in decisions that impact
their livelihood. 218 The ability of workers to engage in peaceful speech in a
public forum on a matter of public concern is important not only for
democratic and civil society values, but also for bringing to light the social
effects of employment disputes, the nature and impacts of transactional
relationships in the ‘‘fissured’’ workplace, and exposing coordination costs
in the New Economy.
The bargaining power imbalance as currently structured into the law’s
primary-secondary distinction can also have adverse microeconomic wage
effects. 219 Where transactional primaries have monopsony power over
workers, and workers are prohibited from engaging in concerted activity
against them, the prohibition reduces worker opportunity to exert
economic pressure to correct for artificially suppressed wages and achieve
a competitive wage. 220 The structural asymmetries between labor and
capital can occur because labor markets function differently than the
auction model of competitive economic theory due to unique frictions
caused primarily by information asymmetries, heterogeneous preferences
speaker-based restriction); Citizens United v. FTC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (holding
federal campaign finance law imposing speaker-based restrictions on corporations
unconstitutional); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. , 458 U.S. 886, 907-15 (1982)
(holding picketing and consumer boycotts constitutionally protected); Police Dep' t of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-102 (1972) (striking down ordinance prohibiting
picketing near schools except when involved in labor disputes); Fisk & Rutter, supra note
27, at 300-15 (arguing that restricting recognitional picketing contravenes current First
Amendment law).
218
See, e.g., John W. Budd, The Effect of Unions on Employee Benefits and NonWage Compensation, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO?, supra note 161, at 160, 177-81; Pope,
supra note 29, at 921 (discussing Supreme Court’s recognition and normative value of
associational and expressive rights in economic matters); Julius Getman, Labor Law and
Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4 (1984). See
also F REEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 157, at 103-10 (discussing empirical findings on
how union voice decreases quit rates and economic impact of exit-voice tradeoff).
219
Stone, Policing Employment, supra note 96, at 357-59 (discussing impact of legal
regulation of strike protections, union organizing and bargaining rules on employeremployee bargaining power and distributive outcomes).
220
For discussion of bargaining power and ability to influence wage rates, see F RITZ
MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 369-70 (1951). For evidence of the
effects of labor market monopsony on worker wages, see supra note 121; CEA, Labor
Market Monopsony, supra note 124, at 10-13.

PICKETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY

55

and mobility costs. 221
The converging trends of workers’ loss of bargaining power, rising
industry concentration, and more widespread evidence of monopsonistic
wage-setting can lead to substantial inefficiencies. Specifically, it can lead
to inefficient reductions in employment and output where workers who
would have been willing to work at the competitive market wage are never
hired, and the output they would have produced is produced less
efficiently by other firms, if at all. 222 Such monopsonistic wage-setting can
also weaken the link between labor productivity and wages because when
firms no longer compete aggressively for workers, wages differ between
and within firms, and even among workers with similar skills. 223 Differing
degrees of worker bargaining power across different groups of workers
can lead to varying degrees of wage depression and within-firm inequality,
particularly for workers in protected classes under the employment
discrimination laws. 224 Wage discrimination is even more prevalent where
firms are able to contract for the price of services as opposed to setting
wages within an internal labor market because of the absence of internal
equity pressures and increased information asymmetry between employers
and outsourced or subcontracted workers relative to direct employees. 225
Additionally, there is extensive empirical evidence that wage theft through
wage-and-hour and overtime violations are more pervasive in the
‘‘fissured’’ workplace than in other work arrangements, resulting in
workers not being paid an efficient wage with limited, if any, labor law
protections to pressure indirect employers for wage increases. 226 Empirical
evidence suggests that workers in contingent or outsourced arrangements
earn considerably less per week than do direct employees with similar
characteristics and in similar occupations. 227 Thus, the overbroad
221

ROBINSON, supra note 121, at 296; MANNING, supra note 88, at 4. See also
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 10511 (1997) (presenting results of empirical study testing workers’ knowledge of legal rules
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Papers 9850 (2016).
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WEIL, supra note 11, at 80.
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secondary picketing ban can have adverse microeconomic wage effects.
Finally, the secondary activity ban’s overinclusive definition of
‘‘secondaries,’’ with its negative effects on worker bargaining power,
precipitates material distributive harms. 228 The ban strips workers in
current workplace arrangements from being able to economically pressure
employers that shrink their share of the pie: ‘‘Fissuring results in
redistribution away from workers and toward investors. It therefore
contributes to the widening income distribution gap.’’229 Arbitrarily
prohibiting worker picketing beyond the confines of a direct employer
prevents workers from exercising leverage over ‘‘capital providers [that]
have the potential interest and the potential ability to offer enhanced
wages’’ so as to ensure ‘‘joint returns of labor and capital it makes
productive, and of an increase in the labor share of these joint returns. ’’230
IV.

PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PICKETING RULE

Given the significant uncertainty surrounding the status of employee
protections in the New Economy, now is an opportune time for
government action to reevaluate secondary activity regulation, and
specifically, the primary-secondary distinction. This Section first explores
how the application of a ‘‘market power rule’’ could predictably and
narrowly protect worker picketing of secondaries as ‘‘transactional
primaries’’ in line with the values of the unified principles. The Section
then discusses other benefits of the proposed rule, including more
effective enforcement of labor and employment laws and its potential to
modernize labor law enforcement by developing the economic expertise of
the Board and the courts in regulating worker protections. The Section
concludes with a discussion of how the market power rule could be
applied in adjudication and through legislation or rulemaking.
A. The Market Power Rule
This Article is the first to put forward an economic standard for
distinguishing primary from secondary employers for the purposes of the
labor law’s secondary boycott ban. It proposes that workers be able to
defend against the claim that they engaged in secondary activity by
228
229
230

Stone, Policing Employment, supra note 96, at 357-59.
WEIL, supra note 11, at 20; see also id. at 92, 280-82.
Harper, supra note 29, at 331.
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showing, via economic evidence, that the target of their boycott or picket,
even if not a direct employer, nevertheless has sufficient market power
over the direct employer’s product market or the relevant labor market to
determine picketing workers’ wages and/or terms and conditions of work
(‘‘market power rule’’). The rule would apply as a defense if workers have
demonstrated majority support for a union and are engaged in
recognitional picketing or picketing due to a bargaining dispute with their
direct employer. 231
1. Success Under New Labor Law’s Unified Principles
Compared to current law distinguishing primaries and secondaries, the
market power rule better protects workers’ expressive activity with
minimal effects on the expressive activity of others, can better correct for
adverse microeconomic wage effects, and promises enhanced
distributional benefits under the unified principles.
First, the rule would dramatically benefit employees in the ‘‘fissured’’
workplace by circumscribing the government’s prohibition of otherwise
First Amendment-protected activity. A labor law that recognizes the
importance of free collective bargaining must give employees the ability to
ask firms and fellow workers at those firms not to deal with their direct
employer when that would be necessary to make the legal right to strike
meaningful in practice. 232 By restricting secondary targets to only those
‘‘transactional primaries’’ with market power over workers’ wages and
working conditions, the rule is more protective of expression and
association in the workplace with little or no constraints on the expression
of picketed employers, who are still free to express their views on their
own private property, or of those employers’ employees, who may
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Weiler, New Balance, supra note 17, at 417-18 (discussing democratic deficit
concerns where workers strike without majority support). To the extent a picketing target
is designated a ‘‘primary’’ under the market power rule, all lawful picketing restrictions
that would apply to a primary would also apply to the ‘‘transactional primary.’’ The rule
goes beyond the exemption for ‘‘area standards’’ picketing --- or picketing to protest an
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strict-liability approach based on market power. See Local 88, Int' l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers (W. Coast Cycle Supply Co.), 208 N.L.R.B. 679,
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express their views and associate with others consistent with any First
Amendment or labor law restrictions. There are also normative reasons to
allow workers and their unions to appeal to others to join in common
cause with them: it resonates in core values of freedom of association and
encourages self-regulation in labor disputes by placing the burden on
workers to make sure their agreements with employers preserve their right
to engage in sympathy actions rather than trading it away for short-term
gains. 233 This could reinforce altruism among workers, ‘‘driv[ing] home
the lesson that the primary responsibility for rescuing the institution of
collective bargaining from its current straits lies not with the government,
but with the workers themselves.’’234
Second, the market power rule is more beneficial than the current law
in its micro- and macroeconomic effects without being overinclusive. As a
matter of economic theory, multi-employer picketing in the settings
described in Section III.B can correct for workers’ unequal bargaining
power and the resulting adverse micro- and macroeconomic effects of
‘‘fissuring.’’ It provides a mechanism for discerning when labor market
segmentation has impacted wage determination for distinguishing
‘‘primaries’’ from ‘‘secondaries’’ and more closely tracks the nature and
scope of multiple contracting employers’ control over a given workforce.
The rule also invites the Board to delineate the effects of different
employers’ control and influence over workers under a more nuanced
theory of the firm, assessing asset usage over primary employers in their
contractual arrangements as well as the division of ex post surplus in those
arrangements relative to worker wages. By extending picketing to
transactional primaries, workers can impose the same pressure on those
employers as they would on their direct employer: establishing a picket
line imposes costs on the indirect employer-----by forcing that employer to
reduce or cease production-----to equalize the bilateral-monopoly character
of labor-management negotiations. 235 The strike-threat itself can function
to realign the interests of those in contractual relationships by
incorporating the risks of economic disruption into the bargaining terms of
direct and indirect employer agreements as well as employment
agreements between the direct employer and its employees. 236 An effective
233
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bilateral-monopoly against all employers that determine workers’ wages
and working conditions can counter inefficient deadweight loss that result
from artificially suppressed wages and employer wage discrimination. 237
Competitive wages that more closely track worker productivity produce
efficiency gains for firms and workers. 238 The rule may also produce
efficiency gains by allowing workers to exert pressure on multi-employer
contractual arrangements that have disrupted ILM benefits, reducing high
transaction costs associated with exclusively transacting in the external
labor market such as asymmetric information and strategic behavior
between firms and between employers and employees. 239 In addition,
clarity in the law’s application could simultaneously target those not
‘‘wholly unconcerned’’ with an underlying labor dispute while contributing
to labor peace by allowing unions and employers to plan strikes and
bargaining positions based on how much economic pressure they can
exert.
Finally, where workers have the opportunity to pressure multiple
employers to come to better wage terms through picketing, as in the CIW
example, they have access to better distribution outcomes, even if the
microeconomic gains of creating a larger pie fail. In other words,
secondary picketing of transactional primaries has fairness benefits that
can effectuate the macroeconomic goals of the labor law by putting more
money into the pockets of lower-income workers.
An objection could be raised that picketing in accordance with the
market power rule would not be effective for a number of reasons. First,
workers’ picket lines may not be respected, resulting in a failure to disrupt
the primary employer’s business relations. Second, transactional primaries
237
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could already have anticipated and either ‘‘baked into’’ their contracts or
contracted around any potential disruption in business relations with the
primary employer such that any picket of a transactional primary would
not produce any additional costs on either that primary or the direct
employer. 240 Indeed, the effectiveness of a secondary boycott will depend
on the nature of the direct employer’s contractual and other relations with
transactional primaries, the willingness of the employees and others
related to the transactional primary to disrupt that employer’s operations,
the risks that those respecting workers’ picket lines may incur by refusing
to cross it, and conditions in both the labor and final product markets. 241
For example, while sympathy strikes may be protected under the NLRA,
employees who engage in them can be permanently replaced by their
employer. 242 To the extent those employees have no-strike clauses in their
collective bargaining agreements, they could also suffer discipline or
discharge without statutory protections. 243
However, as discussed in Section III, 244 employee picketing of
transactional primaries can pressure other employers as well as their
employees to cease dealing with those transactional primaries. The
effectiveness of picketing a transactional primary comes from workers’
ability to limit or block a lead employer, franchisor, or other employers
with monopsony power from alternative, substitutable labor inputs or
products or services reliant on substitutable labor inputs. Enlisting the
assistance of other employees can ‘‘temporarily interrupt[] business
relations between outside firms and the struck employer,’’245 particularly
where the expansion of secondary boycott protections were neither
anticipated by nor incorporated into existing contracts between primary
employers and transactional primaries.
The question of whether employees of transactional primaries would
240
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respect others’ picketing of their employer is indeed a difficult one. But
there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe they would as
well as normative justifications for granting picketing protections in any
case. First, employees of a horizontal transactional primary, such as direct
employees of an employer or a franchisor-run firm that temporary or
franchisee employees are picketing, would respect a secondary picket
because of self-interest: it may aid in achieving higher industry-standard
wages and help ‘‘to preserve their jobs.’’246 Second, employees of a
transactional primary within a vertical arrangement, such as within a
supply-chain arrangement, may decide that possible costs are worth longterm gains of increased union density or larger union or labor movement
support for their own labor disputes down the road (‘‘logrolling’’). 247
Empirical data support these explanations for why transactional primaries’
employees would respect others’ picket lines. 248
2. Anti-Evasion of Labor and Employment Law Enforcement
Second, the market power rule is a key anti-evasion mechanism to
enhance labor law enforcement and employer-employee incentives to selfregulate. Allowing unions to place economic pressure on multiple
employers with market power to determine wages can pressure those
employers to internalize the social costs of others’ bad labor management
or failures to comply with labor and employment laws. As in the CIW
example, picketing can pressure lead employers to more closely monitor

246

REES, supra note 88, at 42-43.
Id. at 43.
248
Brian Klaas & John McClendon, Crossing the Line: The Determinants of Picket
Line Crossing During a Faculty Strike, 16 J. LAB. RES. 331, 331-32, 340-45 (1995);
Michael LeRoy, A Multivariate Analysis of Unionized Employees’ Propensity to Cross
Their Union’s Picket Line, 13 J. LAB. RES. 285, 285-9191 (1992). Indirect evidence of
the success of picket lines comes from extensive litigation and injunctions imposed on
picket lines prior to the NLRA’s grant of worker strike protections, the number of
secondary pickets enjoined prior to Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin, and consistent
employer reliance on the NLRB and the courts to enjoin or seek damages for union
picketing (at least 1,775 NLRB and federal court decisions). MONTGOMERY, supra note
18, at 147-48 (discussing impact of secondary boycotts in nineteenth century); ALAN
MCADAMS, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION 53 (1964) (arguing that, before
Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin, secondary boycotts were ‘‘powerful economic
weapons in the hands of unions’’ and often ‘‘the only effective tool available’’ in union
attempts to organize workers); F RANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 13, at Appendix I-II
(listing litigation history of federal labor injunction cases, including secondary boycott
cases, between 1901-1927).
247

62

PICKETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY

bad labor management and failure to comply with labor and wage-andhour law protections. Further, by protecting workers’ public picketing that
brings pressure to the doors of those that impact their working conditions,
targeted exemptions from the secondary boycott ban facilitate exposure of
the social effects of employment disputes, the nature and impacts of
transactional relationships in the ‘‘fissured’’ workplace, and coordination
costs in the New Economy. 249 Adjudication of multi-employer picketing
would also create a public record detailing employers’ market power over
employees’ wages and working conditions. The rule can thus assist in
publicizing rents received by indirect employers as well as the transaction
costs of purchasing labor inputs through mediating firms. This can
facilitate a correction of information asymmetries and resulting labor
market failures, allowing more effective worker bargaining. In sum, the
rule would function as a critical anti-evasion tool to remove arbitrary
barriers between employees and employers that impact their wages and
conditions of work while also disincentivizing employers’ shirking of
obligations and responsibilities under existing law.
3. Economic Analysis and Modernizing Labor Law
Finally, the market power rule uses economic analysis developed from
the insights of labor economics, theories of the firm and antitrust law,
providing an ideal regulatory framework that modernizes labor law
enforcement and develops Board expertise in assessing the relative
bargaining power of employees and employers. The rule isolates out only
those employers that impact wage determinations and working conditions
without being overinclusive of secondaries that have no relevance to or
impact over labor disputes, as was the original concern of the
prohibition’s drafters. It also establishes clearer rules to assess whether a
target is truly ‘‘neutral,’’ promoting uniformity and predictability in the
NLRB, an agency infamous for politically turbulent adjudication.
Specifically, the rule integrates developments in economy theory and
analysis by providing a functional tool to track the impact of the New
Economy on labor relations. By giving the Board scrutiny over how
ownership rights within a broadened conception of the firm affects worker
and employer incentives, the rule can track employer market power over
employees more precisely. A better grasp on firm incentives and the
249
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effects of corporate organization, firm agreements and ownership rights
will be critical for modern labor law to properly grasp and predict
employer control and employee bargaining power.
Application of the rule would also incorporate the theoretical and
empirical econometric and doctrinal tools developed in contemporary
antitrust law and policy to the analysis of monopsonistic and oligopsonistic
competition in the labor context. Clarity on the primary-secondary
distinction could also serve to better police the line between labor law and
antitrust law, carving out labor’s exemption to antitrust liability only to the
extent that secondary activity functions to further the goals of the labor
laws under the unified principles. A more economically-tailored
enforcement regime would be sensitive to the intersections of labor
markets and firms’ market power in product markets, enabling an
assessment of when such activity is likely to affect price competition. For
example, where product markets are fragmented, boycotts will not likely
harm competition because removing one competitor is unlikely to affect
price competition. Likewise, targeting those who deal with a monopsonist
employer may serve a competitive function of reducing monopsony rents
and encouraging support throughout the supply chain of potential
competitor entrants.
Finally, adjudication of the rule would benefit Board and court
expertise and application of economic standards to labor picketing by
requiring them to make economic assessments and build the universe of
economic data available for their disposal. The Board currently has no
centralized source of empirical data on union-initiated secondary activity,
either with respect to their frequency or the economic impact they have on
‘‘neutrals.’’ Applying the market power rule could harness and effectuate
systemic information gathering through secondary activity adjudications to
identify and restructure doctrinal patterns based on that information.
Similar to proposals made in the criminal law context, 250 the rule can
function to pinpoint and tag relevant labor and product market data in
secondary boycott cases before the Board as well as complementary data
on labor market conditions collected and maintained by the Department of
Labor to create a system for better determining whether a targeted party is
truly ‘‘neutral’’ to a given labor dispute.
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B. Implementing the New Rule

The market power rule can be easily and immediately implemented
through Board and court adjudication. And a broader, more permanent
overhaul of the secondary picketing ban can be implemented through
Board rulemaking or Congressional amendment to the NLRA. This
Section discusses possibilities for the rule’s implementation under each of
these avenues.
First, the market power rule can be applied to secondary boycotts
through adjudication. Section 8(b)(4) does not define ‘‘neutral
employers,’’ and the only guidance available from the Act’s legislative
history is Senator Taft’s remarks describing its purpose. 251 As noted
above, those remarks limit the scope of ‘‘neutrals’’ to those ‘‘wholly
unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his
employees . . . . It is not intended to apply to a case where the third party
is, in effect, in cahoots with or acting as a part of the primary
employer.’’252 While the Board and the courts have often ignored or
narrowly interpreted Taft’s ‘‘wholly unconcerned’’ language, 253 the
Supreme Court requires that the secondary boycott prohibition be
interpreted narrowly because it addresses First Amendment-protected
‘‘expressive activity.’’254
Additionally, the Board should adopt a lower threshold than the
current standard for determining whether two entities are sufficiently
related to be ‘‘primaries.’’ This is because, under other NLRA provisions,
the Government must meet a high burden in showing that two entities are
sufficiently related to extend liability to a secondary, but under Section
8(b)(4), consistent with the Government’s burden to prove unlawful acts,
‘‘a finding that an employer is insufficiently related to the primary dispute
to forfeit its neutrality results in shielding that entity from what would
otherwise be lawful activity under the Act and in assessing liability for an
unfair labor practice against a union.’’255 While the Supreme Court has
251

Local 419, 429 F.2d at 750.
1947 LEGIS. HIST. , supra note 58, at 1106; 95 Cong. Rec. 8709 (1949).
253
See, e.g., Carpet, Linoleum, Soft Tile etc., Local 419 v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392,
401 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that ‘‘mere presence of some economic interdependence’’
between primary and secondary ‘‘will not automatically cause one to lose its secondary
boycott protection’’).
254
DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 576.
255
SEIU, 329 N.L.R.B. at 647 n.17 (Liebman, dissenting).
252

PICKETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY

65

rejected Board or court interference with the substance of employeremployee bargains, the market power rule would not constitute
interference because the restriction extends only to adjudicators writing
the terms of collective bargaining agreements for the parties, not taking a
hands-off approach toward which economic weapons both sides may
wield. 256
Thus, based on the statute’s ambiguous language, its legislative history
and purposes, principles of NLRA construction, and constitutional
requirements, the Board and the courts may interpret ‘‘secondaries’’ as
forfeiting their neutral status and constituting ‘‘transactional primaries’’ or
a more expansive understanding of ‘‘allies’’ under the ally doctrine where
they meet the requirements of the market power rule.
When asserting a defense for picketing under the market power rule,
instead of presenting evidence of common control under the ally or single
employer doctrines, 257 employees would present evidence of the picketed
entity’s power over price, in this case, wages or terms and conditions of
work. As discussed in Section II.D, evidence could be direct or
circumstantial. To summarize, direct evidence includes evidence of: (1)
the actual use of monopsony or oligopsony power to lower wages or
exclude competition in the relevant labor market; (2) actual detrimental
effects, such as reduction in inputs or ability to withhold purchase of labor
inputs; (3) artificially suppressed wages and high barriers to entry; or (4)
wage-fixing agreements between employers. 258
Indirect or circumstantial evidence of market power can include
market share or structural evidence of a monopsonized market or
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monopsonistic competition. 259 Structural evidence of market power can
include the relative size and strength of the picketing target; market
concentration in the relevant market for buying labor inputs or selling
products; fluctuations in the target’s market share; an upward sloping or
somewhat inelastic supply curve in the market for labor inputs; an
inability or unwillingness for new or current purchasers to enter or expand
the amount of their purchases in the market; ease of entry into the industry
and the history of the industry; excess in the demand of labor inputs;
evidence of monopsony or oligopsony profit; evidence of anticompetitive
conduct; the impact of regulation on the labor market; circumstances
indicating that sellers of labor inputs are more dependent on buyers than
buyers on sellers; and other evidence that the market environment is
conducive to and/or facilitates collusion between employers purchasing
labor inputs or selling products in the relevant product market. 260 Where
there is no evidence of an explicit agreement between employers on
wages, employees could present evidence of ‘‘plus factors.’’261 Indirect
evidence may also be offered to indicate that the picketing target is less
responsive to wage changes of the picketing employees’ labor inputs or
price changes in the employer’s product than would be expected in the
competitive labor or product market. 262 Finally, evidence of employee
search costs, labor market frictions, information asymmetries and barriers
to market price discovery, immobile benefits, regulatory or other barriers
to worker mobility imposed by the direct employers’ transactional
arrangement with the picketing target would be relevant for determining
that target’s market power. 263
Employees may also present evidence of ILM effects on wages but for
the fissuring of the labor market as benchmarks. This could include
259
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evidence of the development of firm-specific skills, or skills specific to the
transactional or contractual relationship between the direct employer and
the picketing target as well as evidence of firm-specific value-added by the
employees of the primary to the enterprise of the picketing target. 264 It
could also include:






historical evidence that ILMs previously functioned as
administrative units within which wage-setting and labor allocation
was ‘‘governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures’’
pertaining to methods of compensation, job ladders for in-house
promotional hiring, and benefit and welfare packages in the
employment of employees in the same market for labor inputs;
historical evidence of internal pay equity structures or the
beneficial impact to workers of the picketing target’s
internalization of the pricing of labor inputs on picketing workers’
wages or working conditions;
historical evidence or evidence determined through econometric
regressions that, in a but-for world, the direct employer and the
‘‘secondary’’ benefited or would benefit from establishing internal
structures as a means of capturing the complexity of labor as a
dynamic input of production (i.e., compensation structures that
allow employers to recoup recruitment and training costs and
reducing turnover). 265

Further indirect evidence of market power may be comparator
evidence, for example, that competitors within the same market for labor
inputs as the primary employer, and contract with non-picketed employers
to provide the same or similar labor services, have higher wages, or that
the picketed employer can engage or has engaged in wage discrimination
for labor inputs within the relevant labor market.
Market power may also be demonstrated through transactional and
residual claimant evidence. This may include evidence that the picketing
target has ownership rights that facilitate the joint production and
monitoring of the direct employer’s labor inputs, is a residual claimant
and central party to all contracts with the labor inputs while retaining
rights to observe input behavior, determine assignments, or sell or transfer
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any of the ownership rights it holds. 266 Evidence of the direct employer’s
sunk costs and lock-in effects on picketing employees with respect to the
picketing target would be relevant, as would relationship-specific worker
training and costs to the direct employer of integrating with or contracting
for services with other similar entities within the same buyer’s market.
Employees may also provide evidence that the picketing target owns
residual rights of control over nonhuman assets in the contractual
relationship to indicate its market power over the direct employer.
Additional expert evidence can include econometric analyses that
picketing workers have suffered artificially suppressed wages as a result of
the direct employer’s contractual arrangements with transactional
primaries. Econometric regressions could compare picketing workers’
current wages with a competitive ‘‘but-for’’ wages determined through
historical or other benchmarks as just discussed. Economic evidence could
also be presented of: general price effects of direct employer and
transactional primaries’ anti-competitive conduct; how increasing wages
affects employment levels in the relevant labor market; and how closely
quit rates match wage changes.
Of course, Congress or the Board could also amend or clarify existing
law by establishing the market power rule through an NLRA amendment
or rulemaking. First, while legislative reform to the NLRA has foundered
in recent decades, 267 Congress could clarify the overbroad secondary
picketing ban by more clearly designating as ‘‘primaries’’ or excluding
from the definition of ‘‘secondaries’’ all those who exert sufficient market
power to determine picketing employees wages and/or terms and
conditions of work.
Alternatively, the Board could engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking to clarify the primary-secondary distinction by using its
authority to define ‘‘primaries’’ or exclude from the definition of
‘‘secondaries’’ those entities that have market power to determine
picketing employees’ wages and/or terms and conditions of work. 268
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Clarification through the rulemaking process would not only expand the
scope of legally-sanctioned conduct to exert economic pressure on
secondary targets but could also seek out industry-specific and labor
market-specific comments on the effects of secondary activities.
Specifically, the notice-and-comment process could solicit information on
how incentives and market effects change based on which secondary
targets are induced or impacted, under a range of market conditions and
across horizontal and vertical employer arrangements, whether in
concentrated oligopolistic markets or competitive markets, and whether
the effects fall on neutral employers or the broader social welfare.
Developing an effects-based rule that would incorporate comments from
labor economists, industry and policy experts, labor unions, workers
centers, community organizations and employers would provide the
strongest foundation for a systemic, network- and market-based approach
to resolving ambiguity and the fundamental mismatch between current law
and contemporary working conditions.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that, by integrating contemporary developments in
labor economics, economic theory and antitrust policy, the labor law can
enhance its expertise and best adapt to achieve much needed social welfare
and fairness benefits in the New Economy. It can begin by applying those
developments to the regulation of secondary picketing as a means of
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enhancing worker expression, microeconomic wage effects, and equitable
distributional outcomes under the market power rule.
Such an economic effects-based approach is a critical intervention in
the analysis of labor law regulation more broadly, and it has applications
beyond secondary boycott doctrine. For example, it can illuminate areas
of labor law doctrine to better regulate what types of concerted activity
should be protected and which terms of bargaining ought to be mandatory
or permissive. It can help better tailor remedial mechanisms for labor law
violations and the relevant ‘‘communities of interest’’ of union bargaining
units. Finally, it can even help us understand when a social wage may be
justified where workers cannot achieve an efficient wage.

